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Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to 
another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him 
by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to 
compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to 
be a magistrate[.]1  
I.  INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGETICAL AND INTERPRETIVE RATIONALE 
The Constitution is a legal document.2  Its text was not composed in haphazard 
fashion, nor were its terms fortuitously chosen.  Its drafters were sober men, of 
singular purpose, driven from the inception to construct a founding document 
designed both to eradicate the faults exposed in the British system and to protect 
against the ascendance of the caprice of tyranny over the rule of law.   
The text of the Constitution is then bound unto itself, and the document derives 
its very authority from text whose meaning is etched into history; whose context, 
when apparent, dictates application; and whose application, when ambiguous, finds 
support in the objective meanings attributed to such text, with reference to the 
understandings of the drafters themselves, from the course of history, and from 
normative rules of grammar and usage.3  This textual hermeneutic arises because the 
words of the Constitution are, by their very declaration, supreme law.  In fact, to 
accept the supremacy of the Constitution (to which all legislative, executive, and 
judicial members swear an oath of support), one must first accept the presupposition 
that the Constitution’s text imbues the document with the very authority to grant its 
                                                                
1 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 202 (Russell Kirk ed., 1955) 
(1689). 
2 Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at the Annual Federalist Association, Charles Cuprill 
Chapter (Feb. 13, 2006) (as reported by Melissa McNamara, CBS News, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/main1315619.shtml?source=RSS
&attr=_1315619 (last visited May 27, 2009)) (“The Constitution is not a living organism; it is 
a legal document.  It says something and doesn’t say other things.”). 
3 Indeed, few terms in the Constitution are self-defining, and it is unquestionably the 
proper role of the judiciary to give meaning to these terms where ambiguity exists.  However, 
construction of terms is a far cry from judicial addition, subtraction, and substitution of terms.  
See infra Part I. 
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proclaimed supremacy.4  Any other conclusion makes reference to the Constitution 
secondary, because it improperly, and unnecessarily, binds constitutional text (in the 
application) to some extrinsic body of law, the making of which thereby subordinates 
text to judicial agency; the language of Article VI not only contradicts such an 
outcome, but in fact proscribes it.  Therefore, because the Constitution derives its 
authority from the words of the document itself—from its status as Constitution—
and because Article VI mandates that no agency subordinate to the Constitution may 
violate its authority (even if such agency be entrusted with what we now call judicial 
review5), there can exist no legitimate constitutional law where such jurisprudence 
“evolves” from any method of interpretive review that subjugates such text, or 
creates “tests” or “standards” that supplant or substitute explicit text.  If such be the 
constitutional modality, then the authoritative meaning of that text, which sets forth 
the very authority with which to invoke it, must not, and indeed cannot, suffer at the 
protean attitudes, understandings, or protocol of nine unelected men and women, or a 
majority or plurality of them.6   
And yet, two hundred and twenty-three years post, the text of this document has 
indeed suffered at the hands of such men and women.  Modern constitutional 
jurisprudence and political thought hails such development as proof of an “organic,” 
“evolving,” or “elastic” Constitution.7  The most common method of imposing such 
                                                                
4 See Vasan Kesavan, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 
91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (“To invoke the Constitution as authoritative requires that the 
Constitution be taken on its own terms.  To reject the basis on which the Constitution purports 
to be authoritative and its own specification of what constitutes ‘this Constitution’ is to reject 
any basis for invoking the Constitution as authoritative.”). 
5 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).   
6 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1986) (“What does it mean to say that words in a document 
are law?  One of the things it means is that the words constrain judgment.  They control judges 
every bit as much as they control legislators, executives, and citizens.”); see also Kesavan, 
supra note 4. 
7 This is not to say that a constitution should not evolve over time to address changes that 
the passage of time inevitably brings and adapt to new developments in society or technology 
(e.g., pornography, “virtual” property rights, email and the internet, electronic surveillance, 
etc.), or changes in attitudes or morality.  However, the Constitution as a legal document must 
evolve or expand by interpretation or construction within its own parameters.  Any evolution 
undertaken by addition, subtraction, or substitution must occur by amendment—a designedly 
difficult process.  As Judge Bork (often accused of unwavering adherence to notions of 
“judicial restraint” and “original understanding”) notes of the distinction between judicial 
construction of existing terminology and the judicial creation of extra-constitutional 
principles: any invalidation, on constitutional grounds, of an act of the “political branches” 
must happen “in accord with an inference whose starting point, whose underlying premise, is 
fairly discoverable in the Constitution.”  Bork, supra note 6, at 826 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-2 (Harvard University Press 
1980)).  Bork further clarifies this idea: 
The important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom that is 
given into [judges’] keeping.  A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established 
constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision 
of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty.  That duty . . . is to 
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elasticity occurs through the addition of words and phrases to the text of the 
Constitution, thereby infusing it with both a meaning and an authority foreign to 
itself.8  Thus, Fifth Amendment “liberty” becomes infused with vague notions of 
“privacy,” and equal protection becomes divided into subparts of protected or 
“suspect” classes.  Ultimately, then, there emerges the development of wholly novel 
concepts such as “substantive” due process and other extra-constitutional doctrines, 
concepts evolving not from the text of the document but as authoritative “extra-text,” 
thereby achieving an impossible dichotomy of being melded with the document and 
yet altogether absent from it.9   
More insidious, however, and therefore more difficult to discern, is the opposite 
phenomenon: the disregard of explicit constitutional terminology, which being 
ignored, become orphaned; once orphaned, the text becomes meaningless as law, 
whereby, depending on a particular Justice or plurality of Justices, implicit terms 
become substitutes for explicit text.  Over time, these implicit terms, by rote, derive 
their own explicit status, unquestioned, even unanalyzed; and so existing, thereby 
acquire a surrogate or “shadow” constitutional validity, bearing a more authoritative 
weight than the actual text itself.10  These surrogates, possessing such illegitimate 
rote authority, become imbedded within constitutional jurisprudence as super-
constitutional inquiries that, like “ghoul[s] in . . . late night horror movies,” are 
                                                          
ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made effective in 
today’s circumstances.  The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that end contravenes 
no postulate of judicial restraint. 
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). 
8 In reality, the concept of an “evolving” Constitution is embodied within the document 
itself and is therefore self-executing under the amendment provisions of Article V.  However, 
such a process is by design slow and difficult, and as a result does not serve as a convenient 
means with which to “elastify” the language of the Constitution under the exigencies of any 
particular case implicating its terms.  This author posits one theory for this rationale, and an 
explanation for why such improper—and at times illegal—wielding of judicial power does not 
produce an outcry, or even a whimper, among the general populace, let alone the judiciary as a 
whole.  Oftentimes, the outcome of the case makes palatable the means by which such 
outcome was reached; therefore, in cases with reprehensible facts, the public reaches a 
collective recognition that, to use general parlance, “this cannot be right,” and therefore looks 
to the judiciary to make it right.  The outcome, when the judiciary does endeavor to make it 
right, produces an accompanying collective consensus that justice has prevailed, the nature of 
which either (1) prevents the public from questioning, or even analyzing, whether such justice 
was reached in an improper manner; or (2) otherwise insulates the particular judge or judges 
from any criticism for having so reached “justice” in a constitutionally impermissible manner. 
9 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 31-32 (Free Press 1990). 
10 Bork calls this phenomenon law by judicial “fiat” and “not law in any acceptable sense 
of the word.”  Michael W. McConnell, The First Amendment Jurisprudence of Judge Robert 
H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 63, 65 (1987), quoted in Robert Bork, Forward to G. 
MCDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, at ix (Center 
for Judicial Studies 1985). 
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killed, resurrected, and killed again, as would seem appropriate under the particulars 
of any given case.11   
The consequence of this phenomenon is twofold.  First, ambiguous terms in the 
Constitution, if they be ambiguous at all, become construed by extra-constitutional 
concepts that, adopted on an ad hoc basis, themselves become susceptible to equally 
ambiguous application, which application, in turn, supplants the text itself.12  Second, 
once supplantation occurs, these concepts impregnate the Constitution as part of 
court-created inquiries, “standards,” or “tests” by which whole constitutional 
provisions are construed and interpreted, and thereby become surrogate text, or 
“supertext.” 
Nowhere, in the opinion of this author, is this phenomenon more apparent, 
nowhere is its weakness more exposed, and nowhere is its effect more divisive, than 
in the Establishment Clause cases.13   Just as Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of 
separation,” perhaps the best known or most revered surrogate,14 is now imbedded in 
First Amendment jurisprudence in the sixty years following Everson v. Board of 
Education of Ewing,15 also imbedded are concepts of entanglement, endorsement, 
                                                                
11 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
12 See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury 
Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the “Wall of Separation”, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455, 456 
(1997) (“Occasionally a metaphor is thought to encapsulate so thoroughly an idea or concept 
that it passes into the vocabulary as the standard expression of that idea.  Such is the case with 
the graphic phrase ‘wall of separation between Church & State,’ which in the twentieth 
century has profoundly influenced discourse and policy on church-state relations.  Jefferson’s 
‘wall’ is accepted by many Americans as a pithy description of the constitutionally-prescribed 
church-state arrangement.”); see also DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE 
WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 3 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002) (positing that 
the federal judiciary has found the wall metaphor “irresistible, adopting it not only as an 
organizing theme of church-state jurisprudence but also as a virtual rule of constitutional law,” 
and thereby supplanting actual First Amendment text). 
13 Indeed, in the words of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, “Many of our . . . Establishment 
Clause cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities.”  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 
n.6 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon 
Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1176 
(2006); Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Cutting-Edge Issues in Public Interest Lawyering: Strict 
Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 53 
n.1 (2005), citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, at xviii (Univ. N.C. Press 1994). 
14 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (Harvard University 
Press 2002) (“Two centuries later, Jefferson’s phrase, ‘separation between church and state,’ 
provides the label with which vast numbers of Americans refer to their religious freedom.  In 
the minds of many, his words have even displaced those of the U.S. Constitution, which, by 
contrast, seem neither so apt nor so clear.”).  As will be discussed infra, such use of 
substitutionary surrogates for explicit textual provisions of the Establishment Clause has 
impeded clear textual analysis to the point of rendering such text meaningless, or at a 
minimum, subordinate to its surrogate.   
15 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  Beginning with Justice Black’s opinion in 
Everson, Jefferson’s wall of separation has become standard constitutional fare for layman, 
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coercion, and neutrality—all surrogates for “establishment.”16  While the Court has 
never attempted to create a textual surrogate for “religion,” it has nevertheless 
recognized “symbolic” surrogates such as crosses, menorahs, or manger scenes; 
“invocation” surrogates, such as prayers and so-called moments of silence; 
“utilization” surrogates, such as sectarian use of public facilities; or “funding” 
surrogates, such as printing allowances or school vouchers.17  However, from the 
standpoint that “religion” is itself not an ambiguous concept, the Court has never 
attempted to limit or expand its import beyond what it already would seem to 
encompass by implication.18         
Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence oscillates between no less than five 
approaches—Lemon,19 endorsement, coercion, neutrality, and a “history and 
traditions” approach last seen in Van Orden20 and McCreary County.21  
Unfortunately, the Court applies none of these approaches consistently, cannot 
decide which approach to utilize in any given situation, and even where it will use a 
test, does not apply it uniformly.  Furthermore, when expedient, the Court appears to 
craft a hybrid of these approaches, e.g.: Lemon’s purpose and effect with 
endorsement and coercion; neutrality as indicative of endorsement or Lemon’s 
purpose; psychological coercion mixed with Lemon’s effect prong; and in its most 
current form, a hybrid combining a history and traditions approach with Lemon’s 
purpose/effects prongs, as indicative of neutrality.  As this thesis posits, such an 
inconsistent state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not only unsurprising, but 
is altogether expected, as these tests, often created ad hoc, cannot be applied 
uniformly, or exclusively it would seem.  Even if they could, all present what can be 
termed as “super-constitutional” or “supertextual” principles.   
The Lemon approach, when even applied, is so detached from “establishment of 
religion” that several Justices have labeled it unworkable and called for it to be 
                                                          
law student, and judge alike.  In fact, as stated in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 
242 (1968), “[t]he constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State.” 
16 As will be discussed infra, the “entanglement” aspect is most closely aligned to the 
surrogate concept of “separation,” and the concepts of “endorsement” and “coercion” at least 
minimally align themselves with the actual text, “establishment.”  However, none of these 
concepts have been applied uniformly or consistently.  Neutrality, by contrast, seems more of 
an indicia of endorsement/establishment rather than a test thereof. 
17 As will be discussed infra, such disparate use of surrogates lends itself to inconsistent 
outcomes, and the myriad tests that derive therefrom are themselves not uniformly applied, 
rendering Establishment Clause jurisprudence “inchoate if not incoherent.”  EDWIN MEESE III, 
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 304 (Mathew Spalding & David Forte eds., 
Heritage Foundation 2005). 
18 For this reason, all Establishment Clause approaches analyze state action in terms of 
“religion” without ever attempting to define religion, or at least to conceptualize it in some 
fashion.  Instead, such approaches merely presume its involvement.  This begs the question, 
addressed infra, as to what constitutes “religion” for First Amendment purposes. 
19 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).   
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
21 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
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overruled.  The endorsement approach is the offspring of Lemon, and similarly lacks 
any consideration of “establishment” as that term would necessarily imply some 
affirmative stance taken by government carrying with it the force of law.  The 
coercion approach coexists with the first two approaches, albeit independently; and 
while coercion appears to address the concept of legal compulsion, in practice, it has 
instead relied upon considerations of the subjective, “psychological” effect of a 
statute, policy, or practice on the complainant.  History and traditions analysis, while 
relevant as to the founders’ understanding of the meaning of text, remains helplessly, 
and hopelessly, inconsistent, as it all too often leads to conflicting interpretations of 
the same text.  Neutrality lacks any constitutional basis whatsoever, and therefore 
remains the most ambiguous of approaches. 
This thesis proposes an approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence (and one 
applicable to constitutional interpretation as a whole) that maintains fidelity to the 
Constitution by confining the application and interpretation of explicit text to the 
strictures of well-established norms of grammar and usage.  It will begin by 
analyzing the disparities created through the addition or substitution of super-textual 
language to the clause through the use of surrogate concepts, and will demonstrate 
that any such method of constitutional adjudication becomes unworkable and 
incoherent once such tests utilize surrogate concepts and terminology.  Through 
grammatical exegesis will emerge the theory that the Religion “phrases”22 do not 
afford competing protections, and adhering most closely to the structure and 
meaning of the Religion Clause as a whole, more specifically, with respect to the 
grammatical interplay of its two adjectival subparts, the present participle phrases 
“respecting an establishment of religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” 
a new normative meaning, a modality, emerges, where the Establishment “phrase” 
becomes construed in its truest context, as an adjectival phrase modifying “law.”  
This “linguistic modality”23 thus respects and maintains the integrity of the document 
as drafted, and ensures that the words and context employed by the Founders—to 
which indelible significance adhered at the moment of inscription—remain governed 
by normative rules of grammar and usage (e.g., “Standard Written English”); only in 
this way does the language of 1787/1791 become bound by the same semantic and 
linguistic norms as bind the language today.  In other words, this approach places a 
type of “linguistic seal” upon the Constitution that allows judicial interpretation to 
achieve consistent application within the parameters of modern society.  Since 
judges today are bound by the same rules of grammar and usage comprising standard 
written English that bound the framers at the Constitutional Convention, this 
linguistic approach seals the original structure of the text within the parameters of 
modern application.   
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to employ 
such an approach vis-à-vis the language of the Second Amendment in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,24 wherein the Court analyzed the grammatical structure of the 
Amendment and identified the text as setting forth a “prefatory” clause and an 
                                                                
22 See discussion infra Part IV. 
23 Defined and discussed infra Part IV. 
24 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
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“operative” clause, and then construed the former clause as giving meaning to the 
latter.  The Court also focused on the meanings of the individual terms contained 
within each clause, i.e., “militia,” “right,” “people,” and “keep and bear Arms.”  
Thus, the Court has at least laid the groundwork for the adoption of a new approach 
to constitutional interpretation: one that utilizes the rules of grammar and usage, 
rather than concepts of original understanding that are often hard to discern, so as to 
reach decisions that adhere most closely to the text and meaning of the Constitution 
as written.   
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHMENT25 
Even before the creation of the Federal Constitution or state constitutions, 
religious life in colonial America involved, to a large extent, ideas of “favored” or 
“recognized” religions versus  religious minorities.26  Adherents to disfavored 
religions became “dissenters” who were fearful that any dissent would unleash 
penalty or punishment from the state, or at least, exclusion from the benefits 
bestowed upon the “favored” believers.27  The Founders were thus more concerned  
with securing religious liberty, as opposed to segregating government from 
religion,28 and to this end, from the standpoint of dissent, affording protection against 
government reprisal—either direct (punishment) or indirect (exclusion).29     
                                                                
25 The following is but a brief recitation of the history of religious establishment in the 
colonies and serves as both a description of the environment existing at the time the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified and as a backdrop for the language chosen in the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause.  For a more detailed view of establishment in the colonies, 
see Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003). 
26 This concept has been recognized by the Court in its “endorsement” approach to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence—an approach particularly espoused by Justice O’Connor 
discussed infra Part III.B.3. 
27 See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 9-10:  
The dissenters were the adherents of minority denominations that refused to 
conform to the churches established by law.  The established churches (Episcopal in 
the southern states and Congregationalist in most New England States) were 
established through state laws that, most notably, gave government salaries to 
ministers on account of their religion.  Whereas the religious liberty demanded by 
most dissenters was a freedom from the laws that created these establishments, the 
separation of church and state was an old, anticlerical, and, increasingly, 
antiecclesiastical conception of the relationship between church and state.  As might 
be expected, therefore, separation was not something desired by most religious 
dissenters or guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Indeed, it was quite distinct from 
the religious liberty protected in any clause of an American Constitution, whether that 
of the federal government or that of any state. 
28 This religious liberty, of course, is also protected by the Free Exercise Clause; however, 
early concerns involved not so much the freedom to practice one’s religion as they did the 
notion of the social ostracism descended upon a disfavored sect and, to a lesser extent, the 
denial of privileges or status given to “established” religions. 
29 See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 89-107.  The states with established religions 
originally imposed penalties on those holding dissenting viewpoints.  These states ended 
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Any examination of this concept of “establishment” must occur within this 
context.  In light of the colonial history, the drafters of the Constitution deliberately 
chose the word “establishment” over a more generic or even more comprehensive 
word; such choice was not accidental.30  Furthermore, the founders understood the 
phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” to have particular import at drafting, 
one designed to protect against the establishment of a national religion, the likes of 
which the founders had experienced firsthand in Great Britain and the likes from 
which many citizens had escaped in other European countries.31  Notwithstanding 
this, prior to the American Revolution the Anglican Church was officially 
established in the five southern colonies, and more often than not, Puritanism (i.e., 
Congregationalism)—out of favor in England—was the established church in most 
New England colonies, Rhode Island excepted.32   
Of course, the Religion Clause of First Amendment itself clearly states, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the Free Exercise thereof . . . .”33  The drafters employed this language, as generally 
understood at the time, principally so as to afford a two-tiered protection: (1) against 
the establishment of a national religion on the one hand, and (2) against any 
                                                          
sanctions but instead enacted specified privileges for their established denominations—
notably, salaries for the established clergy.  Against such establishments, dissenters sought not 
only a freedom from penalties (whether in terms of the “freedom of worship” or the “free 
exercise of religion”) but also guarantees against the unequal distribution of government 
salaries and other benefits on account of differences in religious beliefs.  Some dissenters even 
demanded assurances that there would not be any civil law taking “cognizance” of religion.  
As a result, the colonial constitutions drafted to accommodate the antiestablishment demands 
of dissenters guaranteed religious liberty in terms of these limitations on government—
specifically, limits on discrimination by civil laws.  Id. 
30 Some delegates urged either stronger or weaker language; e.g., “Congress shall make no 
law touching religion” or taking “cognizance” of religion.  HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 
106-07. 
31 Germany, Scandinavia, France, and Holland had established religions in one form or 
another.  See McConnell, supra note 25, at 2107. 
32 Id. at 2115-16.  With respect to usage as to the various religious denominations, Judge 
McConnell provides a concise explanation at footnote 54:  
The term “Anglican” did not come into contemporaneous use until the eighteenth 
century, but I use it here as a shorthand for the Church of England prior to 
Independence. The term “Episcopalian” was sometimes used in reference to the 
Church of England prior to Independence, but I will reserve it to refer to the American 
successor to the Church of England after Independence.  I will use the term “Puritan” 
to denote the congregational Reformed Protestantism of New England in the hundred 
or so years after settlement, and the term “Congregationalist” to denote the same 
church after the mid-1700s, when it had lost the theological and behavioral rigor that 
is associated with the term “Puritan.”  I will use the term “Calvinist” or “Reformed” to 
encompass not only Puritans and Congregationalists, but also Presbyterians, Dutch 
Reformed, Independents, and other denominations whose theology derives from the 
thoughts of John Calvin. 
Id. at 2115 n.54. 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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concomitant disestablishment of existing state religions.34  Prior to victory over Great 
Britain, nine of the thirteen colonies had established churches, and at the time the 
First Amendment was adopted, several states continued to recognize some form of 
religious establishment.35   
Thus, the idea of “establishment”—both from the colonial standpoint and at the 
drafting of the federal Constitution—encompassed, and was understood to entail, 
much more than just official “recognition” of a particular church or sect.  In 
particular, for the Southern colonies, religious establishments consisted of laws 
compelling religious observance, providing financial support for the ministry, 
controlling the selection of religious personnel, dictating the content of religious 
teaching and worship, vesting certain civil functions in church officials, and 
imposing sanctions for the public exercise of religion outside of the established 
church.  This was the model throughout the South, although the systems in the 
Carolinas and Georgia allowed for greater toleration of dissention.36   
In New England, establishment resembled less the Anglican models in that its 
structure was based on locality, i.e., centered around the particular convictions of the 
townsfolk rather than a central church.  This is significant only from the standpoint 
of the scope of establishment; in New England, there was local establishment, 
whereas in Virginia, state establishment.37  New England also differed from the 
Southern colonies in that Congregationalism was the established faith; thus, 
members of the Church of England were considered the dissenters (the dissenters in 
the Southern colonies were the established faith in New England, and vice versa).  
Prior to the Revolution, New England engaged in the practice of punishing 
dissenters; however, because the dissenting Anglicans in New England still wielded 
political power back in England, this policy never quite reached the harshness of the 
policy in the South, particularly, Virginia.38     
Whatever the nature and extent of establishments existing in the Colonies prior to 
the Constitution, all involved, by necessity, one common element: official promotion 
and recognition by the governmental authority.  As stated by Judge McConnell: “An 
establishment may be narrow (focused on a particular set of beliefs) or broad 
(encompassing a certain range of opinion); it may be more or less coercive; and it 
                                                                
34 A disestablishment of a state religion would be, in effect, an exercise of denominational 
or sectarian favoritism on the part of the federal government, whether in the form of aid, 
subsidy, or recognition.  See Patrick-Justice, supra note 13, at 55 n.9 (quoting LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988) (“A growing body of 
evidence suggests that the Framers principally intended the establishment clause to perform 
two functions: to protect state religious establishments from national displacement, and to 
prevent the national government from aiding some but not all religions.”); see also 
McConnell, supra note 25, at 2109.  See generally MEESE, supra note 17, at 303. 
35 McConnell, supra note 25, at 2107. 
36 Id. at 2119.  It must be noted that the most extreme model of establishment, that which 
was found in Virginia, eventually broke down or dissipated by the time of the American 
Revolution; however, even such dissipation did not end the official church in Virginia until the 
state enacted the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786.  Id. at 2120. 
37 Id. at 2121. 
38 Id. at 2124-26. 
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may be tolerant or intolerant of other views.  During the period between initial 
settlement and ultimate disestablishment, American religious establishments moved 
from being narrow, coercive, and intolerant to being broad, relatively noncoercive, 
and tolerant.”39  
Establishment itself requires an object, i.e., the establishment of something or 
someone.  Given the historical context in which the Founders viewed “religion,” it 
can best be described as what I will call religion in a “hard” sense, meaning: if a 
“church” or a “religion” were established (in the sense described by McConnell), 
then it perforce required that something, or some set of ideas, be not only set forth, 
but set forth definitively, with the full endorsement and backing of the state.  If there 
be punishment of dissent, there must be something from which the dissent derives.  
If there be compulsory church attendance, there must be a church to which 
attendance is compelled.  Or if there be political favoritism for members of an 
established religion, there must be something with which to determine membership 
therein, and who the favored are.  All these factors, then, from the Founders’ 
perspective, and from the history of what was being established, would not only 
imply, but require, adherence to a defining creed, a hierarchy of authority, and a 
teaching of doctrine and orthodoxy, within the context of establishment.40  And while 
some colonies may have tolerated dissent more readily than others, the dissenters, if 
they be dissenters, become so by virtue of their refusal to adhere to certain doctrine, 
orthodoxy of faith, and recognition of proper church authority (e.g., Catholicism and 
the Pope, the Anglican Church and the monarch, etc.).41 
                                                                
39 Id. at 2131.  Judge McConnell goes on to list six common characteristics of laws 
constituting establishment:  
Although the laws . . . were ad hoc and unsystematic, they can be summarized in six 
categories: (1) control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2) 
compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in 
dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions for public functions; and (6) 
restriction of political participation to members of the established church.’ 
Id.  
40 For example, in New York—originally a Dutch settlement—local congregations 
selected their own ministers, but the “Classis” assembly in Amsterdam retained control over 
clerical qualifications and enforced adherence to the doctrinal orthodoxy of the Reformed 
Church.  Id. at 2129-30.  When the English took control of the colony, notwithstanding the 
tolerance shown to the Dutch church, the Duke of York nevertheless established a Protestant 
church.  Id. at 2130.  New York continued to recognize the Dutch Reformed churches 
(derivatives of Calvinism), until eventually, the Governor of New York mandated that all four 
of New York’s counties “call[], induct[], and establish[], a good sufficient Protestant 
Minister.”  Id.  Thus, while establishment itself might change, each subsequent establishment 
requires adherence to a doctrinal orthodoxy of some sort.  See id. 
41 The purpose of this paper is not to reach a determinative definition of “religion” as such, 
but rather to establish the proposition that “hard” religion may be the subject of establishment 
for Establishment Clause purposes while “soft” notions of religion may not.  In fact, “soft” 
notions of religion are not religion at all with respect to the Establishment clause (discussed 
infra).  This process is by no means some academic exercise; it is a governing principle 
derived from the text of the Constitution itself.  For a more academic and detailed discussion 
of “religion,” see Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. 
L. REV. 181 (2002). 
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III.  JUDICIAL CONCEPTS OF ESTABLISHMENT—SURROGATE TERMS AS SUPERTEXT 
A.  The “Wall of Separation” 
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court had little opportunity to 
address, let alone interpret, the Establishment Clause, and as such, generated little 
substantive case law on the topic.42  While as early as 1879 the Supreme Court 
referenced, as a definitive phrase, Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor in 
Reynolds v. United States,43 it did not go so far as to adopt it as controlling, extra-
textual language until seven decades later, in Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing.44  Everson involved, among other things, a constitutional challenge to a New 
Jersey statute that authorized local school districts to make “rules and contracts” for 
the transportation to and from school for those children living “remote” from a 
schoolhouse.  The statute excluded schools operated for profit but did not exclude 
other private or parochial schools.   
Acting pursuant to the statute, the Board of Education of Ewing promulgated a 
rule authorizing reimbursement to parents who had, at their own expense, arranged 
public bus transportation to school for their children.  The Board authorized part of 
the money to be used to reimburse those parents who sent their children to Catholic 
schools.  Plaintiff Everson brought suit in his capacity as a district taxpayer, 
challenging the statute on various constitutional grounds, both state and federal, 
including the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court, after a 
lengthy discussion of the history and rationale underlying the adoption of the 
Establishment Clause, and after determining that the Fourteenth Amendment made 
the First Amendment applicable to the States, held that the statute at issue did not 
constitute an establishment.  The Court set forth its Establishment Clause analysis as 
requiring separation between church and state: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another.  Neither can force or influence a person to go to 
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a 
                                                                
42 See Robert L. Cord, Book Note, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and 
Current Fiction, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1509 (1984); see also ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 108 (Lambeth Press 1982); Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 n.1 (1992) (discussing pre-Everson cases); Elizabeth A. 
Harvey, Case Note, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test 
Out of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 302 (2001). 
43 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 145, 164 (1879).  This “wall of separation” 
was originally penned by Jefferson in a January 1, 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association, some 11 years after the ratification of the First Amendment.  Dreisbach, supra 
note 12, at 1.  While, again, this paper does not undertake a discussion or analysis of either the 
text of the letter or the meaning Jefferson gave to such “wall,” the actual phrase may not have 
originally been Jefferson’s in the first place.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 38-45; 
Dreisbach, supra note 12, at 71-72. 
44 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups 
and vice versa.  In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between 
church and State.”45 
In sum, the Court concluded that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between 
church and state,” and “[t]hat wall must be kept high and impregnable.”46  Therefore, 
the Court “could not approve the slightest breach.”47 
The statute at issue did not violate the Establishment Clause.48  While the Court 
was careful to strike a balance between state action that aided or supported a 
religious institution on the one hand versus a denial of such aid that would in effect 
“hamper” citizens in the free exercise of their religion on the other, the Court 
nevertheless found an implied mandate of neutrality: “[the First Amendment] 
requires the state to be . . . neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers 
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.”49   
Apparently, the Court in Everson was persuaded that the New Jersey statute did 
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause given that the “aid” rendered to parents 
sending their children to parochial schools was equally rendered to parents of public 
                                                                
45 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.  In Everson, the Court for the first time held that the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment applied to the States through the 
“incorporation” doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 15.  Not surprisingly, after 
Everson, Establishment Clause litigation mushroomed.  However, despite citing Jefferson’s 
“wall” metaphor, and the additional language that such wall must remain “high and 
impregnable,” the Court nevertheless concluded that the New Jersey statute did not “breach” 
the wall.  Id. at 18.  In so doing, the Court recited at length the experiences of the American 
colonists of various religions and the underlying rationale behind the adaptation of the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 8-13.  It is interesting to note that the Court’s recitation described what can 
accurately be termed the “evils and dangers” of true “establishment,” and in that regard, 
Everson remained more faithful to the text of the First Amendment than has often since 
occurred.  Equally noteworthy, the Court qualified or recognized the establishment of religion 
“by law,” which qualification has since been ignored or abandoned.  See id. at 12 n.12. 
46 Id. at 18.  The Court did not cite Jefferson’s wall as a starting point, or as law, but rather, 
as a descriptive metaphor; nor did the court create surrogate language to replace 
“establishment” or religion, in the sense of creating extra-constitutional principles; however, it 
did add to that metaphor, describing the wall as “high and impregnable.”  Id. at 16, 18.  In any 
case, as will be discussed infra, such judicial restraint has not remained in subsequent 
decisions. 
47 Id. at 18. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 Id. at 18.  As will be discussed infra, the concept of neutrality has no place in 
Establishment Clause analysis. 
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school children.  While New Jersey could provide transportation to public school 
children, it could not, in the name of protecting the citizenry from the specter of an 
“established” church, prohibit the extension of the general benefits of its laws to 
citizens on the basis of religion.  Conversely, New Jersey could extend such benefits 
to the general public without regard for religious belief, so long as the aid rendered 
fell neutrally on all citizens.  Concomitantly, the denial of a neutrally-applied aid to 
parochial schools, aid “so separate[ly] and so indisputably marked off from the 
religious function [of such schools],” would hamper the ability of those schools to 
function where they otherwise could exist under state law, an outcome “obviously 
not the purpose of the First Amendment.”50     
Despite its limited scope, Everson set the groundwork for today’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.51  In so doing, it began a line of reasoning and constitutional 
jurisprudence that abandons concepts of establishment and religion and embraces the 
surrogate concepts of neutrality, entanglement, and endorsement, which are often 
confused and/or equated with the concept of “separation.”52  Unfortunately, the 
Court’s treatment of “separation” has evolved from the neutrality expressed in 
Everson to the “aggressive separation” reached in later years.53   
                                                                
50 Id. 
51 See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Mythical “Wall of Separation”: How a Misused 
Metaphor Changed Church-State Law, Policy and Discourse, 6 FIRST PRINCIPLES, June, 23, 
2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/fp6.cfm (“In the half-century 
since this landmark ruling, the ‘wall of separation’ has become the locus classicus of the 
notion that the First Amendment separated religion and the civil state, thereby mandating a 
strictly secular polity.  The trope’s continuing influence can be seen in Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s recent warning that our democracy is threatened ‘[w]henever we remove a brick 
from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government.’”) (quoting Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
52 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 889 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Alembik, supra note 13, at 1185; Harvey, supra note 42, at 307-08 (applied to 
cases with government aid to facilities including religious institutions, and Rosenberger’s 
neutrality test); see also Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County 
v. ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 317, 337-38 (2006). 
53 “Aggressive separation” as the term is used here conveys the role undertaken by the 
Court as a sentry posed at Jefferson’s wall, gun in hand, ready to repel any intruder upon the 
wall’s keep.  As such, the Court began to strike down both laws and government practices that 
it felt too closely aligned government with religious subjects, the result being the creation of 
extra-textual safeguards to accomplish this end, be they proscriptions against entanglement or 
endorsement or the mandate of complete neutrality.  See infra Part III. 
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B.  Paradigms of Separation—Aggressive Separation 
1.  Lemon v. Kurtzman 
The birth of this “aggressive separation” took place some fifteen years after 
Everson, in the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.54  The Court, expanding on 
Everson, attempted for the first time to furnish a decisional “test” out of what it 
termed the “opaque” language of the Establishment Clause.55  In so doing, the Court 
derived its test “with reference to the three main evils against which the 
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,’” such ideals 
“gleaned” from criteria “developed by the Court over many years.”56 
Lemon involved a constitutional challenge to two separate Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid to church-related elementary and 
secondary schools.  Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute at issue provided financial 
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the form of 
reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional 
materials incurred by such schools in connection with specified secular subjects.  
The state reimbursement, funded by state taxation on cigarettes, applied only to those 
courses also “presented in the curricula of the public schools.”57    
Similar but not identical to the Pennsylvania statute, the Rhode Island statute 
authorized the state to directly subsidize, in the form of a salary supplement, “an 
amount not in excess of 15%” of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects58 in 
                                                                
54 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). However, even the Lemon Court 
acknowledged that “total separation” between church and state was not possible “in an 
absolute sense.”  Id. at 614.  Nonetheless, cases subsequent to Lemon have recognized that the 
Lemon test has been disproportionately used to reflect unwarranted hostility to religion.  
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 665 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
55 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  See also Harvey, supra note 42, at 303; Alembik, supra note 
13, at 1177-78. 
56 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).  
Interestingly, in finding these “many years,” the Court cited (in addition to Everson) a mere 
two cases—both decided within three years—reciting the “cumulative criteria developed by 
the Court over many years” so as to craft its new test.  Id.  Furthermore, it is unclear where the 
Court found such development over many years, given, as stated supra note 45, the Court, 
prior to Everson in 1947, had little opportunity to address the Establishment Clause, and 
never, prior to Everson, applied it to state action.  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
57 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (West 1971) 
(repealed 1977)).  The statute was passed to address a perceived “crisis” in Pennsylvania’s 
nonpublic schools due to rising costs relating to “purely secular educational objectives.”  Id. at 
609 (citation omitted).  The Court found that, since the inception of the statute, some five 
million dollars had been expended annually to nonpublic schools, of which over 96% were 
“church-related,” mostly Roman Catholic.  Id. at 610. 
58 Id. at 607.  Any teacher who taught a subject not offered in the Rhode Island public 
school system was not eligible for the supplement; furthermore, any teacher receiving the 
supplement was prohibited from teaching any religious subject.  Id. at 608. 
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nonpublic elementary schools.  Such supplement was paid directly to the teachers.  
However, the Rhode Island statute also provided that, as supplemented, a nonpublic 
schoolteacher’s salary could not exceed the maximum paid to public school 
teachers.59  It was undisputed that under both statutory schemes, state aid had been 
given to “church-related” educational institutions.60   
The Court struck down both statutes as unconstitutional establishments of 
religion.  In so doing, the Court initially examined the actual text of the 
Establishment Clause, finding it “at best opaque.”61  The Court paid particular 
attention to the “respecting” aspect of establishment, and concluded that the 
Establishment Clause forbade those laws that constituted “a step that could lead to . 
. . establishment” even if such laws “[fell] short of [establishment’s] realization,”62 
thereby broadening the scope of the term “establishment” to encompass laws that 
might fall short of establishment and yet nevertheless respect an establishment.63   
This being the case, the Court now had to develop criterion with which to 
determine such an outcome.  Consisting of three parts, the Court adopted a test as a 
hybrid of two previous cases, School District of Abington v. Schempp64 and Walz v. 
Tax Commission,65 and mandated that:  
 
(1) the statute at issue must have a secular legislative purpose (the “purpose” 
prong); 
(2) the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; (the “effects” prong); 
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion (the “entanglement” prong).66   
 
Applying this test to the statutes at issue, the Court found that neither the 
Pennsylvania nor Rhode Island statutes violated the purpose prong.67  With respect to 
                                                                
59 Id. at 607.  The Rhode Island statute was based on a legislative finding that “the quality 
of education available in nonpublic elementary schools has been jeopardized by the rapidly 
rising salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers.”  Id. 
60 Id. at 606. 
61 Id. at 612. 
62 Id. at 612.   
63 Other cases have referred to the “tendency” toward the establishment of religion.  See, 
e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
64 School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (involving the reading of 
Bible passages in public schools). 
65 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 664 (upholding a tax exemption for places of 
religious worship). 
66 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.  These prongs exist as freestanding propositions, not 
conditionally precedent on the others nor in any way conjunctively construed—any one of 
which, if found to exist, would constitute establishment and invalidate the law at issue.  See 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987); Harvey, supra note 42, at 305. 
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the effects prong, the Court, while stating that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
programs “approached, even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under 
the Religion Clauses,” nevertheless declined to determine whether the principal or 
primary effects of the statutes infringed upon the proscribed advancement or 
inhibition of religion.68  The “entanglement” prong, however, became the Court’s 
basis for striking down the laws at issue.  In so doing, the Court held that the 
“cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State” 
involved the “excessive entanglement between government and religion.”69 
2.  Lemon Neglected, History Examined—Marsh v. Chambers 
The Court began its selective retreat from the Lemon inquiry twelve years later in 
Marsh v. Chambers.70  Marsh involved a constitutional challenge brought by several 
Nebraska legislators to the practice of their legislature opening each legislative 
session with prayers delivered by a state-paid Presbyterian chaplain.  The district 
court found that the prayer itself did not violate the Establishment Clause but that the 
act of paying the chaplain with state funds did, and entered an injunction barring 
such expenditure of public money.71  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down the entire practice as violative of the Establishment Clause and enjoined both 
the prayer and the funding.72  On certiorari, the Supreme Court limited its review to 
the constitutionality of opening legislative sessions with prayers led by state-
employed clergy, and held that neither the act of having a clergyman open legislative 
sessions with prayer, nor the act of paying him to do so, violated the Establishment 
Clause.73  
                                                          
67Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (“Inquiry into the legislative purposes . . . affords no basis for a 
conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion.”). 
68 Id. at 613. 
69 Id. at 614. When examining a statute under the entanglement prong to determine if 
government entanglement is in fact “excessive,” the Court will consider “the character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and 
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”  Id. at 615.  
The Lemon Court concluded there were, essentially, two forms of entanglement: (1) a state 
statute or program might involve the state impermissibly in monitoring and overseeing 
religious affairs; or (2) a state statute or program might have the potential to create a political 
atmosphere divided along religious lines.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798-99 
(1983).  It bears noting that, given the disjunctive nature of the three-part test, whether the 
Court even needed to craft the purpose and effect prongs, considering the foregone conclusion 
that if a statute at issue was found to violate these first two prongs, it would, perforce, violate 
the entanglement prong as well.  Thus, the entanglement prong is not only a catchall prong but 
it also, in effect, engulfs and swallows and merges with the first two.  As such, the 
entanglement prong stands alone and achieves the surrogate status of constitutional text.     
70 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).   
71 Id. at 785.  The district court also barred the collection and publication of such prayers at 
the state’s expense.  Id. at 785 n.3.  That part of the decision was not appealed.  Id. 
72 Id. at 785-86. 
73 Id. at 793-95. 
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In reaching its decision, the majority did not reference Lemon or employ its three-
pronged approach.  Rather, the majority analyzed legislative prayer from the 
perspective of  the historical and traditional practices of the Founding Fathers during 
the opening session of the First Congress, and at the outset noted that “[i]t can hardly 
be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint 
and to pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First 
Amendment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of 
the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable,” and with respect 
to the Nebraska practice at issue, that “it would be incongruous to interpret that 
Clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the 
draftsman imposed on the Federal Government.”74  While the majority 
acknowledged that “[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary 
violations of constitutional guarantees,” it nevertheless afforded great weight to the 
“unbroken practice” of both the federal and state legislatures in finding that the 
Nebraska practice was more a “tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country” than an impending threat of establishment of 
religion.75  
3.  Contextual Neutrality and the Origins of Endorsement—Lynch v. Donnelly 
The Court’s next phase of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the evolution 
of “separation” as interpretive doctrine, occurred in Lynch v. Donnelly.76  Lynch 
involved a Christmas display owned and maintained by the City of Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island and situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and annually 
erected by the city.  Apart from the usual Christmas fare, the display also contained a 
crèche, or Nativity scene, which had been part of the display for over forty years.  
The crèche itself consisted of traditional figures for such a display, including the 
infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, shepherds, angels, kings, and animals, all ranging in 
height from five inches to five feet.77   
Residents of Pawtucket and the Rhode Island affiliate of the ACLU brought suit 
in United States District Court challenging the inclusion of the crèche in the 
Christmas display.  The district court held that inclusion of the crèche violated the 
Establishment Clause, and a divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.78  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.79  
                                                                
74 Id. at 790-91. 
75 Id. at 790, 792.  The majority also gave due consideration to the fact that legislative 
prayers involved adults rather than, say, schoolchildren susceptible to “religious 
indoctrination.”  Id. at 792.  In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan dismissed the history and 
tradition approach as “wrong” and chastised the majority for not deciding the case under 
Lemon.  Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The dissent summarily rejected legislative prayer 
as unconstitutional, finding the “religious” purpose of legislative prayer to be “self-evident.”  
Id. at 797.  Furthermore, the dissent found that the primary effect of legislative prayer is 
“clearly religious.”  See id. at 797 n.4. 
76 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
77 Id. at 671. 
78 Id. at 672. 
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, recognized, while the First 
Amendment was designed to prevent the intrusion of either religion or government 
into the provinces of the other, “total separation” was not possible.80  In so 
recognizing, the Court believed that the “wall of separation,” while a useful 
metaphor, was “not a[n] . . . accurate description of the practical aspects of the 
relationship that in fact exists between church and state.”81  The Court also 
recognized that “the Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church 
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all 
religions and forbids hostility toward any.”82 
The Court also paid particular attention to the contemporaneous understanding of 
the framers as to the guarantees afforded by the Establishment Clause.  The Court 
noted that the First Congress (whose members had been delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention), in the same week it approved the Establishment Clause 
as part of the Bill of Rights, enacted legislation providing for paid chaplains for the 
House and Senate.83  The Court afforded the constitutional decisions of the First 
Congress the “greatest weight” as an interpretive mechanism.84   
The Court went on to discuss the significance of religion in many of the nation’s 
holidays, namely, Thanksgiving and Christmas, and acknowledged that Congress 
had authorized the President to proclaim a national day of prayer each year, “on 
which [day] the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and 
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.”85  The Court also found 
historical accommodation of religion in Presidential proclamations commemorating 
Jewish Heritage Week and the Jewish High Holy Days.86  The Court declined to take 
a “rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause” in light of historical examples 
of accommodation, and limited its analysis “to determine whether, in reality, it 
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”87 
Despite its refusal to adopt an “absolutist view,” the Court nevertheless seemed 
resigned to the conclusion that “no fixed, per se rule can be framed,” and that “the 
purpose of the Establishment Clause was to state an objective, not to write a 
                                                          
79 Id.  
80 Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614). 
81 Id. at 673. 
82 Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1952) and Illinois ex rel. 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948)).  This notion that accommodation bears 
any relevance to an Establishment Clause stems from the Court’s misperception as to the 
relationship between the Establishment phrase and the Free Exercise phrase.  See infra Part 
III.D. 
83 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 677 (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1994), amended by 36 U.S.C. § 119 (2000)). 
86 Id. (citing Proclamation No. 4844, 3 C.F.R. 30 (1982) and 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1058 (Sept. 29, 1981)). 
87 Id. at 678 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 671, 669). 
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statute.”88  The Court thus refused to be confined to any single “test or criterion,” 
citing Lemon but declining to apply it to the facts before it.89  Rather, the Court 
focused on the crèche wholly within the context of the Christmas season, and 
whether the state action had any secular purpose.  After reviewing cases where the 
Court had invalidated state action on the grounds that a secular purpose was found 
lacking,90 the Court turned to the crèche at issue and found that, while itself a 
religious symbol, when analyzed in the entire context of the Christmas display and 
the Christmas season generally, the city’s inclusion of the crèche in the display 
served an appropriate secular purpose, given the historical significance of the 
Christmas event in the context of the history and traditions of the country.91   
The Court also declined to consider inclusion of the crèche as conferring a 
substantial and impermissible benefit upon religion in general, and the Christian faith 
in particular.  The Court reasoned that the crèche conferred no more of a benefit 
upon religion than did state-supplied textbooks to church-sponsored schools,92 
expenditure of public money for transportation to ecclesiastical schools,93 federal 
grants for college buildings of religious colleges combining religious and secular 
education,94 noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities,95 
tax exemptions for church properties,96 and Sunday Closing Laws.97  The Court 
concluded that any benefit to religion or Christianity bestowed by the presence of the 
crèche was “indirect, remote, and incidental.”98  Given the minimal amount of money 
expended on maintenance of the crèche, the Court also found no administrative 
entanglement between religion and government.99   
                                                                
88 Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668). 
89 Id. at 679. 
90 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding a state statute requiring the posting of 
Ten Commandments on public classroom walls invalid for lack of secular purpose); Abington, 
374 U.S. at 205 (holding invalid a state statute requiring daily Bible readings in public 
schools; Bible readings not part of a secular school curriculum but rather motivated wholly by 
religious considerations); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding daily invocation 
of God’s blessings mandated by city’s board of education and read aloud over public school 
address system are “wholly inconsistent” with the Establishment Clause notwithstanding 
students’ right not to participate). 
91 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-85. 
92 Id. at 681 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). 
93 Id. at 681-82 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 1). 
94 Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)). 
95 Id. (citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)). 
96 Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 664) 
97 Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)). 
98 Id. at 683. 
99 Id. at 683-84. 
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Most significant about the Lynch case was Justice O’Connor’s separate 
concurring opinion, wherein for the first time she espoused a “clarification” of the 
Lemon doctrine, often called the “endorsement” approach to Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.100  In particular, Justice O’Connor saw two principal ways that 
government action could “run afoul” of the First Amendment: (1) “excessive 
entanglement with religious institutions,” which (a) “may interfere with the 
independence of [such] institutions,” (b) afford such institutions “access to 
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents,” and (c) 
“foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines”; and (2) 
“government endorsement or disapproval of religion,” which O’Connor saw as a 
“more direct” infringement on the First Amendment.101  According to O’Connor, 
government endorsement of religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”  Government disapproval of religion, on the other hand, would send the 
opposite message.102  
O’Connor proceeded to apply her proffered approach to Lemon’s three prongs.  
With respect to the entanglement prong, O’Connor expressly limited the analysis to 
“institutional entanglement.”103  O’Connor refused to extend the idea of 
entanglement to any “political divisiveness” created by such religious displays, 
stating flatly that “political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an 
independent test of constitutionality,” and that the constitutional inquiry “should 
focus ultimately on the character of the government activity that might cause such 
divisiveness, not . . . the divisiveness itself.”104  With respect to Lemon’s purpose and 
effect prongs, O’Connor’s inquiry focused on the notion of endorsement, 
specifically, (1) what the city of Pawtucket “intended to communicate” by inclusion 
of the crèche (purpose), and (2) irrespective of intent, what message the city’s 
inclusion of the crèche actually conveyed to observers thereof, based both upon the 
objective message sent and the subjective meaning attributed by recipients of such 
message.105  
In “clarifying” Lemon, O’Connor stated that under the purpose prong, the 
analysis should focus not on whether the state action at issue possessed some secular 
purpose, but rather, whether the state, by virtue of the activity, intends to convey a 
general message of “endorsement or disapproval of religion.”106  O’Connor found no 
intent to convey or promote a religious message with respect to inclusion of the 
crèche, but only intent to “celebrat[e] . . . the public holiday through [use of] 
                                                                
100 Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
101 Id. at 687-88. 
102 Id. at 688. 
103 Id. at 689. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 690. 
106 Id. at 691-92. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
724 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:703 
 
 
traditional symbols.”107  O’Connor rejected the notion that a determination of intent 
could be made independent of a consideration of the overall purpose of the display at 
issue.  O’Connor found that the celebration of public holidays has cultural 
significance even if it also has religious significance; for this reason, she found 
inclusion of traditional symbols to be within the parameters of a legitimate secular 
purpose.108 
Turning to the “effect” aspect of the endorsement analysis, O’Connor similarly 
rejected the notion that the effect prong of Lemon required invalidation of 
government action merely because such action in fact causes, even as a primary 
effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.109  Instead, O’Connor looked to 
whether the state action at issue had the effect of conveying a message of official 
endorsement or disapproval of religion to the extent that the state action makes 
religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, to status in the political 
community.110  O’Connor found the display at issue did not communicate a message 
of governmental endorsement of Christianity.111  O’Connor reasoned that the overall 
holiday setting of the display, while not of itself sufficing to neutralize the religious 
significance of the crèche, nevertheless “changes” what viewers of the crèche would 
fairly understand to be the purpose of the crèche, i.e., to celebrate a traditional 
holiday using traditional symbols of that holiday, and not an endorsement of the 
religion from which the holiday originates.112   
The dissent, while acknowledging that the Religion Clauses of the Constitution 
had “proved difficult to apply,” nevertheless looked to the Lemon test for guidance in 
“assessing whether a . . . governmental practice involves an impermissible step 
toward the establishment of religion.”113  The dissent chided the majority for its 
“less-than-vigorous” application of Lemon, and opined that the familiar traditions of 
the Christmas holiday could not justify departure from the precedent set by Lemon.114  
Applying Lemon, the dissent found both a religious purpose to the crèche as well as a 
primary effect of (1) advancing the government’s “imprimatur of approval,” and (2) 
conferring the “prestige of government” on Christian beliefs associated with the 
crèche.115  Finally, the dissent found that inclusion of the crèche in the Christmas 
display fostered an excessive entanglement between government and religion in that 
other religious groups would invariably begin to petition Pawtucket for inclusion of 
                                                                
107 Id. at 691. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 691-92. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 692. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 696. 
115 Id. at 701 (citing Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982)). 
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their religious symbols in the display, such requests the city would then be 
compelled to accommodate.116  
C.  The Wall Reinforced—Lemon’s “Fourth Prong” 
1.  Endorsement Supplants Lemon—Wallace v. Jaffree 
In Wallace v. Jaffree,117 the Court addressed three Alabama state statutes: the first 
authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation”;118 
the second authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for 
meditation or voluntary prayer”;119 and the third authorized teachers to lead “willing 
students” in prescribed prayer to the “Almighty God” as “Creator and Supreme 
Judge of the world.”120   
A parent of three schoolchildren challenged the constitutionality of the statutes 
and sought to enjoin their operation.  The district court found no constitutional 
infirmity with the first statute but concluded that the latter two were “an effort on the 
part of the state of Alabama to encourage a religious activity.”121  Nevertheless, the 
district court refused to find them unconstitutional, holding that the state of Alabama 
had the power to establish a state religion if it so chose.122  The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, holding the second and 
third statutes unconstitutional.123  The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect 
to the constitutionality of the second statute, section 16-1-20.1, which authorized a 
one-minute period of silence for “prayer and meditation.”124   
                                                                
116 Id. at 702. 
117 Wallace v. Jaffrey, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
118 Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1984)). 
119 Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984)). 
120 Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984)).  The text of 16-1-20.2 also contained a 
declaration that “the Lord God is one”; the actual text of the prescribed prayer therein 
contained the following supplication: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God.  We acknowledge You as the Creator and 
Supreme Judge of the world.  May your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound 
this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the 
sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord.  
Amen.   
Id.   
121 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41 n.5 (citing Jafree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 
1982)). 
122 Id. at 41 n.6 (citing Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 
1983)). 
123 Id. at 41 n.7 (citing Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-39 (11th Cir. 1983)).   
124 Id. at 45 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982)).  The Court had previously 
unanimously affirmed the finding by the court of appeals as to the unconstitutionality of the 
third statute at issue, ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984) (invocation of “Almighty God” as 
“Creator and Supreme Judge of the world”).  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924, 925 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
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At the outset, the Court flatly rejected any notion that the state of Alabama could 
constitutionally establish any religion.125  With respect to section 16-1-20.1, the 
majority of the Court examined what it once again termed “criteria developed over 
many years” and cited the three-pronged approach of Lemon and found that section 
16-1-20.1 violated the purpose prong.126  However, in applying the purpose prong, 
the Court enmeshed the analysis with O’Connor’s endorsement analysis first set 
forth in Lynch, stating that “[i]n applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 
‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.’”127  
Under the revised standard, the Court determined that ample evidence existed in the 
record to support a conclusion that section 16-1-20.1 lacked any secular purpose 
whatsoever.128  In particular, the Court found the addition of the words “voluntary 
prayer,” the legislative history, as well as trial testimony from state legislators, 
indicative of but one purpose, i.e., to “return voluntary prayer to the public 
schools.”129  Most significantly, while the majority cited Lemon and purported to 
apply its three-pronged approach, the majority nevertheless focused the analysis on 
whether the Alabama statute amounted to an unconstitutional endorsement of 
religion.130  Citing Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, the 
Court held: 
For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the 
questions that we must ask is “whether the government intends to convey 
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”  The well-
supported concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals—that § 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of state 
approval of prayer activities in the public schools—make it unnecessary, 
and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practical significance of the 
addition of the words “or voluntary prayer” to the statute.  Keeping in 
mind, as we must, “both the fundamental place held by the Establishment 
Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which 
Establishment Clause values can be eroded, we conclude that § 16-1-20.1 
violates the First Amendment.131    
After a separate concurring opinion by Justice Powell wherein he argued for 
continued adherence to Lemon, Justice O’Connor again reaffirmed her call to clarify 
or rework Lemon, as first set forth in her concurring opinion in Lynch.132  O’Connor 
                                                                
125 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48. 
126 Id. at 56. 
127 Id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).         
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 57-60. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 60-61 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91, 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(footnotes omitted). 
132 Id. at 67. 
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reiterated previous statements by the Court that “it is far easier to agree on the 
purpose that underlies the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their 
application.”133  She also noted that, while she was “not ready to abandon all aspects 
of the Lemon test,” she nevertheless opined that application of the Lemon test had 
proven “problematic,” and strove to accomplish more than to merely “erect a 
constitutional ‘signpost’ to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our 
predilections may dictate.”134  Rather, she sought to craft a standard for constitutional 
adjudication “that is not only grounded in the history and language of the first 
amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant 
problems.”135 
In O’Connor’s view, the endorsement/disapproval approach encompassed the 
first two prongs of Lemon in that it “requires courts to examine whether 
government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys 
a message of endorsement.”136  As such, endorsement analysis did not preclude the 
state from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account when making 
law and public policy; it did, however, preclude government from conveying or 
attempting to convey a message that religion, or a particular religious belief, is 
favored or preferred by the state.  The latter would place the “power, prestige and 
financial support of government . . . behind a particular religious belief,” thereby 
creating an indirect but nonetheless “coercive pressure” on religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing religious sentiment.137  O’Connor stressed that under the 
endorsement analysis, legislatively mandated moments of silence, without more, 
would not likely violate the Establishment Clause; however, O’Connor was careful 
to point out that moment of silence legislation, either as drafted or as implemented, 
could theoretically favor a child who prays over a child who does not, especially 
where a teacher might exhort the schoolchildren to use the allotted moment of 
silence for prayer.138  
Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion.  He termed the majority’s 
holding “curious,” and criticized the analysis under both the Lemon and endorsement 
                                                                
133 Id. at 68 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 694). 
134 Id. at 68-69. 
135 Id. at 69 (quoting Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed 
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1963)). 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 70 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431). 
138 Id. at 73-74.  O’Connor rejected the argument made by the State of Alabama that 
allowing for moments of silence and voluntary prayer amounted to nothing more than an 
adjustment to the school schedule to meet sectarian needs, and that it was permissible under 
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.  O’Connor felt that while allowing for moments of silence might 
constitute such an “adjustment,” moments of silence coupled with encouragement to pray by 
the State “converts an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority 
to use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a religious 
exercise.”  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74 n.2 (citing Abington, 374 U.S. at 226). 
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approaches.139  With respect to endorsement, Burger argued that to make an 
Establishment Clause distinction between legislation allowing a moment of silence 
and legislation allowing a moment of silence during which a student may engage in 
prayer “manifests not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”140   
Justice Rehnquist offered a more vigorous dissent.  Rehnquist cited Everson141 
and what he termed the “exegesis” of Establishment Clause doctrine and the “wall of 
separation” metaphor as first quoted in Reynolds v. United States.142  Rehnquist flatly 
asserted, “[i]t is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken 
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause 
has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for nearly 40 
years.”143  After a lengthy review of the drafting of the Establishment Clause, the 
history of the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification process, Rehnquist 
concluded the Establishment Clause forbade only government preference among 
religious sects or denominations and did not require absolute neutrality on matters 
religious.144 
From his recitation of the history of the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist flatly 
rejected the continued viability of separation as a constitutional touchstone, declaring 
it “all but useless” as a guiding principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and 
that its “greatest injury” was “its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual 
intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights.”145  To Rehnquist, the “wall” metaphor 
was historically inaccurate, based on “bad history,” “useless as a guide to judging,” 
and should be “explicitly abandoned.”146  Rehnquist next characterized Lemon’s 
three part test as adding “mortar” to Everson’s wall, thereby implying that Lemon 
compounded the mistake made in Everson.147  Rehnquist faulted the Lemon test as 
historically unsound, continued adherence to which would inevitably cause fractures 
within the Court and produce “unworkable plurality opinions.”148  In the end, 
Rehnquist discarded Lemon and with it “the mists of an unnecessary metaphor.”149 
                                                                
139 Id. at 85. 
140 Id. 
141 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
142 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
143 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 106. 
145 Id. at 107. 
146 Id.  Of course, while Rehnquist cast doubt on the wall metaphor, his explication of the 
history of the Establishment Clause did not lead him to the conclusion that, as a textual matter, 
any use of the wall metaphor amounted to the creation of extra-constitutional language.  Id. 
147 Id. at 108. 
148 Id. at 110. 
149 Id. at 112.  In this passage, Rehnquist indicated that he would not follow the 
“neutrality” approach to the Establishment Clause that would eventually arise in the Court.  
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844; Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677 (2005). 
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2.  Endorsement, Fracture, and the Birth of Coercion—County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Rehnquist’s predicted “fracture” of the Court proved true in the watershed case of 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,150 where O’Connor’s 
endorsement approach finally garnered a plurality of the Court.  Allegheny involved 
a challenge brought by the American Civil Liberties Union and several individual 
residents of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, seeking (1) to permanently enjoin the County 
of Allegheny’s display of a crèche containing a banner reading “Gloria in Excelsis 
Deo” within the confines of the county courthouse, and (2) to enjoin the City of 
Pittsburgh from displaying a Chanukah menorah located outside the City-County 
Building alongside the city’s forty-five foot decorated Christmas tree and a sign 
bearing the mayor’s name and entitled “Salute to Liberty.”151  The district court, 
relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, denied the injunction and entered judgment for the 
county and the city.152  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing 
Lynch v. Donnelly and holding that both displays constituted an impermissible 
governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman.153  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
In a jaggedly divided decision, consisting of seven parts each joined by different 
Justices, the Court held that the crèche at issue violated the Establishment Clause but 
that the menorah did not.  The majority’s exact approach is difficult to ascertain as to 
a decisional rule of law; nevertheless, the Court adopted O’Connor’s endorsement 
analysis, at least as a starting point, seemingly replacing the analysis under Lemon’s 
effects prong.154  While the majority found the Lynch decision useless as a matter of 
guiding precedent, it found O’Connor’s concurrence had set forth a “sound analytical 
framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.”155  The Allegheny 
majority thus found two constitutional principles emerging from O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Lynch: first, a flat rejection of any notion that the Court would 
tolerate even minimal endorsement of religion;156 second, a “sound” method for 
determining whether the government’s use of an object or symbol with religious 
meaning, whether standing alone or as part of a larger display, would constitute or 
                                                                
150 County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
151 Id. at 581-82, 588-89.  Beneath the title of the sign read: “During this holiday season, 
the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.  Let these festive lights remind us that we are keepers of 
the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.”  Id. at 582. 
152 Id. at 588. 
153 Id. at 588-89. 
154 Id. at 590.  The Court has stated that “[t]here is no need here to review the applications 
in Lynch of the ‘purpose’ and ‘entanglement’ elements of the Lemon inquiry, since in the 
present action the Court of Appeals did not consider these issues.”  Id. at 594 n.45.  O’Connor 
in fact proposed combining Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs into her endorsement 
approach.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
155 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595. 
156 Id.  
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otherwise convey the endorsement of religion.157  Implicit in this analysis would be 
what effect the religious object would have on the ordinary observer thereof, or 
stated alternatively, the subjective message the state’s use of the object fairly sends 
to the ordinary observer.158  This question would turn, then, on the overall setting in 
which such object appears, be it in a museum gallery, a Christmas display, a 
classroom decoration, etc.  As a result, the analysis would become one applied on a 
case-by-case basis such that each challenged use of a religious object would be 
“judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it [endorses] religion.”159  
In a lengthy footnote, the Court explained the differences between the approach 
taken by the majority in Lynch and the approach taken in O’Connor’s concurrence, 
stressing that O’Connor’s approach would allow government acknowledgment of 
religion only so far as such recognition would serve as a means to “solemniz[e] 
public occasions” or recognize “what is worthy of appreciation in society,” and not 
amount to government approval of a particular belief.160 
The majority then turned its analysis to the crèche display within the County 
Courthouse.  At the outset, the Court rejected the arguments of the county and the 
city that religious symbols must be shown to be coercive before they would run afoul 
of the Establishment Clause.161  Rather, the Court found sufficient the purely passive 
display of religious symbology, a more or less “silent” endorsement.162  Of particular 
concern to the Court was the display’s lack of neutralizing elements, such as were 
found in Lynch.163  The Court refused to find the presence of neutralizing displays of 
Santa Claus and other secular decorations displayed in other parts of the courthouse 
convincing; apparently, for the Court, the proximity of religious elements with 
secular elements became a deciding factor.164  Equally relevant under the Court’s 
analysis was the placement of the crèche itself—the Court concluded that given the 
crèche’s display at the Grand Staircase of the courthouse, “[n]o viewer could 
reasonably think that it occupies this location without the support and approval of the 
government.”165  The Court found government endorsement notwithstanding the 
presence of a placard indicating that a Roman Catholic organization, and not the city 
or the county, owned the crèche.166  Finally, it rejected arguments that the crèche was 
                                                                
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
160 Id. at 595 n.46.  The Court has never adopted any method by which to make such a 
distinction; nevertheless, terms such as “approval” are so far removed from textual language, 
and so much broader in scope, as to become impossible guideposts for anything other than 
naked judicial power to strike down any particular state action. 
161 Id. at 597 n.47. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 598. 
164 Id. at 598 n.48. 
165 Id. at 599-600 n.50. 
166 Id. at 600-01. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/4
2009] A NEW ORIGINALISM 731 
 
a permissible symbol of Christmas as a national holiday, stating that the government 
may not celebrate Christmas in such a way that “endorses Christian doctrine.”167  
Justice Kennedy, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and 
Scalia joined, dissented with respect to the crèche display, concluding that it did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.168  The dissent noted the Court’s previous rulings 
that demanded state neutrality towards religion, lest any government recognition of 
religion confer an “imprimatur of state approval,” to a point requiring a “relentless 
extirpation of all contact between government and religion.”169  The dissent felt that 
the majority’s endorsement approach, which depended heavily upon context and 
perception, would unduly and in fact uncharacteristically require the government “in 
all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so to 
the detriment of the religious.”170   
Kennedy’s dissent examined previous decisions and gleaned from them “two 
limiting principles” that guided Establishment Clause cases.171  Guided by these 
principles, the dissent fashioned a rule that stood in stark contrast to the majority’s 
open-ended endorsement approach: 
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may 
not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct 
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact “establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”  These two principles, while 
distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be difficult indeed to establish a 
religion without some measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the 
form of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a 
state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental 
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.172 
The dissent viewed the endorsement approach as a “novel theory,” and the Court’s 
growing reliance on it as becoming “a permanent accretion to the law.”173  As such, 
the dissent endeavored to demonstrate that the endorsement approach was both 
“flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.”174  The dissent stressed that 
the meaning of the Establishment Clause must derive not from the impressions 
occasioned upon the “reasonable observer” but rather determined by reference to 
historical practices and understandings.175  The dissent saw the First Amendment as 
                                                                
167 Id. at 601.   
168 Id. at 655. 
169 Id. at 657. 
170 Id.    
171 Id. at 659. 
172 Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted). 
173 Id. at 669. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 670.  Reference to historical practices must relate to “those conducted by 
government units . . . subject to the constraints of the Establishment Clause.  Acts of ‘official 
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“a rule, not a digest or compendium,” and its application not to be premised on the 
objective feelings of some fictional “reasonable observer,” and whether he or she 
might be made to feel “like an outsider” to the body politic that is government.176  As 
the dissent pointedly stated, “[i]f the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect 
individuals from mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer [or exhortations 
to prayer made by the President] cannot escape invalidation” under the endorsement 
test.177   
Apart from its history and traditions criticism, the Allegheny dissent further 
criticized the “endorsement-in-context” approach to government use of religious 
symbolism as creating a “jurisprudence of minutiae”: 
A reviewing court must consider whether the city has included Santas, 
talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular symbols as “a center of 
attention separate from the [religious symbol].”  After determining 
whether these centers of attention are sufficiently “separate” that each 
“had their specific visual story to tell,” the court must then measure their 
proximity to the [religious symbol] . . . [as well as] the prominence of the 
setting in which the [religious] display is placed . . . .  Deciding cases on 
the basis of such an unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable 
with the imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional 
adjudication.178   
The dissent then concluded by stating that the majority’s approach transformed the 
Court into a “national theology board,” such that the application of a “strict 
separationist view” of prohibiting any acknowledgment of religion would produce a 
consistency of application preferable to the endorsement approach.179  In any event, 
decisions regarding the inclusion of religious symbols in holiday displays would best 
be left to local legislative officials; if such inclusion offends the body politic, then 
the proper remedy for such offense lies at the ballot box, and not through the 
hammer of constitutional promulgation.    
3.  Coercion Unbound—Lee v. Weisman 
Kennedy’s coercion model controlled the outcome in Lee v. Weisman.180  
Weisman involved a constitutional challenge to the practice of including prayers and 
benedictions during school graduation ceremonies.  Specifically, school principals in 
the City of Providence, Rhode Island invited members of the clergy to offer 
invocation and benediction prayers as part of the formal graduation ceremonies for 
middle school and high school students.  Such practice was permitted by the 
                                                          
discrimination against non-Christians’ perpetrated in the 18th and 19th centuries by States and 
municipalities” become “irrelevant” to this inquiry, but the practices of past Congresses and 
Presidents are “highly informative.”  Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 673. 
178 Id. at 674-76. 
179 Id. at 678. 
180 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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Providence School Committee and the Superintendent of Schools, and many 
principals elected to have clergy deliver the prayers during the graduation events.  As 
part of this custom, Providence school officials supplied the clergy with a pamphlet 
entitled “Guidelines for Civic Occasions.”181  This pamphlet recommended that 
prayers delivered at nonsectarian civic ceremonies be done with “inclusiveness and 
sensitivity,” but also admonished that “prayer of any kind may be inappropriate on 
some civic occasions.”182  
In June 1989, Nathan Bishop Middle School’s principal, Robert E. Lee, invited 
Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to deliver prayers at the graduation exercises.183  Rabbi 
Gutterman received the instruction pamphlet and was advised by Lee that his prayers 
should remain nonsectarian.184  Rabbi Gutterman delivered an invocation and a 
benediction, addressing “God” and thanking God for various blessings bestowed 
upon America in general and the graduating students in particular, and asking God’s 
guidance for the students in their future endeavors.185  At no time in his prayer did 
Rabbi Gutterman invoke any sectarian reference either to Yahweh, Jehovah, or 
Adonai, to the Jewish faith or to the Lord or Jesus Christ of the Christian faith.186   
Deborah Weisman was one of the students graduating from Nathan Bishop.  Four 
days before the graduation ceremony, her father, Daniel Weisman brought suit in 
United States District Court as a Providence taxpayer and as next friend of Deborah, 
seeking to enjoin the reading of the prayers at the ceremony.187  The district court 
denied a temporary restraining order, and the graduation ceremony went forward as 
planned, with Deborah in attendance.188  Following the ceremony, Daniel Weisman 
filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction barring officials from 
Providence public schools from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and 
benedictions at future graduations.189  On stipulated facts, the district court, applying 
Lemon, granted a permanent injunction, ruling that Providence’s practice of 
including invocations and benedictions in public school graduations violated the 
Establishment Clause, and specifically, that such prayers, even if nonsectarian, 
created “an identification of governmental power with religious practice,” thereby 
                                                                
181 Id. at 581. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 581-82. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 584. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
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effectively endorsing religion.190  The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,191 and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.192 
The Court began its analysis with the proclamation that “it is beyond dispute that, 
at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone 
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”193  However, the 
Court expanded the concept of coercion to include “subtle coercive pressure,” most 
pronounced in the confines of public education, wherein such coercion occurs simply 
because the student partaking in such graduation exercise, itself not mandatory, lacks 
any “real alternative which would have allowed [him or] her to avoid the fact or 
appearance of participation.”194  The Court also found that while the clergy recited a 
prayer of his or her own choosing, the principal of the school in fact directed and 
controlled the content of the prayers through the issuance of the guidelines pamphlet 
and through the instruction that the prayers remain “non-sectarian.”195   
The Court then clarified what it believed the impetus behind the Establishment 
Clause to be: 
The explanation [the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on forms of state 
intervention in religious affairs] lies in the lesson of history that was and 
is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands 
of government what might begin as tolerant expression of religious views 
may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.  A state-created orthodoxy 
puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole 
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.196 
                                                                
190 Id. at 585. 
191 Id.  
192 Lee v. Weisman, 499 U.S. 918, 918 (1991). 
193 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). 
194 Id. at 588.  This conclusion might acquire greater validity in the context of activity 
occurring within the overall student-school relationship, where a dissenting student may 
reasonably fear some form of academic reprisal for voicing dissent.  However, in the context 
of a graduation ceremony, where the student-school relationship has already ceased, such fear 
becomes less compelling.   
195 Although the Court acknowledged that the clergy had no obligation to follow these 
guidelines or instructions, it nevertheless found, without any apparent factual support in the 
record, that “no religious representative who valued his or her continued reputation and 
effectiveness in the community would incur the state’s displeasure” by ignoring the principal’s 
instructions.  Id.  It could be equally assumed that no clergy would compromise religious or 
ecclesiastical sanctity for concerns over political expediency.  In any event, not only did the 
Court conclude that the students were coerced to participate, but that the rabbi was equally 
coerced to follow state-sponsored religious doctrine.  See id. 
196 Id. at 591-92.  The majority appears more concerned with the quality of faith that might 
be compromised by any type of state coercion, as opposed to the imposition of creed and 
orthodoxy through the machinations of government, where the Church, as an institution, 
possesses political power, such as the Roman papacy that emerged under Constantine. 
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The Court proceeded to examine the subtle coercion that it found to exist within the 
graduation ceremony itself: 
The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of 
a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain 
respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.  This pressure, 
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion [to 
participate] . . . .  It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that 
for her the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect, 
rather than participation.  What matters is that, given our social 
conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the 
group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.197 
The majority placed great emphasis on the circumstances of the case, from the 
standpoint that the target audience, school-age children, “are often more susceptible 
to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in 
matters of social convention.”198  The Court thus found the implied “choice” of 
students whether to participate or not an illusory one, and reasoned that “the 
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use 
more direct means.”199  As such, the injury experienced by the students would be one 
occasioned by their required participation, under the aegis of the State, in a religious 
exercise.  The Court rejected the notion that inclusion of the prayer, however brief, 
constituted but a de minimus intrusion, opining that to hold such prayer as de 
minimus would be an “affront” to the rabbi who offered them and to the students 
who held them sacred.200   
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and 
O’Connor, reiterated Jefferson’s oft-cited “wall of separation,” and the reasoning in 
Everson.201  The concurrence also cited existing Court precedent202 as support for the 
proposition that any religious reference in the public school setting, even if 
denominationally neutral and voluntary, nonetheless violated the Establishment 
Clause as de facto state sponsorship of religious activities.  The concurrence then 
                                                                
197 Id. at 593.       
198 Id. at 593-94 (citations omitted). 
199 Id. at 594. 
200 Id.  This conclusion of course now places the analysis equally on the audience and on 
the purveyor of the religious message, but again begs the question as to whether any religious 
message, if it be religious at all, could even conceivably be devoid of profound meaning upon 
its adherents.  It is in fact doubtful whether any religious expression could have any meaning 
at all absent such a defining characteristic; in fact, any contrary conclusion would invite the 
absurd possibility of the promotion of a religious message nonetheless devoid of religious 
content, thereby ceasing to be religious at all. 
201 Id. at 600-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
202 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (prayer selected by state authority to be read aloud by 
students); Abington, 374 U.S. at 206-07 (Bible reading or recitation of the Lord’s prayer over 
school address system); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98 (law preventing the teaching of evolution). 
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concluded that the majority’s finding of coercion, subtle or not, although not 
necessary to show an Establishment Clause violation, would suffice to show 
endorsement: “[g]overnment pressure to participate in religious activity is an obvious 
indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion.”203   
Justice Souter’s separate concurrence addressed two interrelated issues: (1) 
whether the Establishment Clause proscribes state practices that show no preference 
to any religion or denomination, and (2) whether state coercion, above and beyond 
any state endorsement of religious exercise or belief, is a necessary element of an 
Establishment Clause violation.204  In answering the first question in the affirmative, 
Souter concluded that the Establishment Clause forbids any state sponsored prayers, 
whether theistic or sectarian.205  Souter termed this “settled law.”206 
Souter next turned to the element of coercion.  While acknowledging the “force” 
of the coercion arguments, Souter nevertheless declined to adopt a coercion analysis, 
an adoption he felt the Court could not undertake “without abandoning our settled 
law.”207  As Souter reasoned: 
Like the provisions about ‘due’ process and ‘unreasonable’ searches and 
seizures, the constitutional language forbidding laws ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion’ is not pellucid.  But virtually everyone 
acknowledges that the Clause bans more than formal establishments of 
religion in the traditional sense, that is, massive state support for religion 
through, among other means, comprehensive schemes of taxation . . . .  
This much follows from the Framers’ explicit rejection of simpler 
provisions prohibiting either the establishment of a religion or laws 
‘establishing religion’ in favor of the broader ban on laws ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion.’208 
Justice Scalia authored a scathing dissent.  Scalia posited a “history and traditions” 
approach to the Establishment Clause, citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Allegheny.  Scalia accused the majority of implementing a “bulldozer of its social 
engineering” through its invention of a “boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, 
test of psychological coercion,” through which it “lays waste a tradition that is as old 
as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an 
even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public 
                                                                
203 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
204 Id. at 609. 
205 Id. at 610. 
206 Souter’s “settled law” speaks only in generalities, of imprecise and at times divergent 
concepts of “religious purpose,” religious message, of “preferential support,” of “symbolic 
union of church and state.”  Id. at 612-19.   
207 Id. at 618.  Souter does not identify any precise rule gleaned from the “settled law,” 
other than oblique references to vague, subjective prohibitions against government 
sponsorship or approval of certain religions over others or of religion over nonreligion.  See id. 
at 610-31.  Strangely, the only settled test adopted by the Court to date—Lemon—Souter 
neglected to apply.  See id. 
208 Id. at 620.   
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celebrations generally.”209  To Scalia, interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
should “‘comport with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding 
of its guarantees,’” where such evidence “‘sheds light not only on what the 
draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought 
that Clause applied’ to contemporaneous practices.”210  After discussing the history 
of the nation with respect to the inclusion of prayer in governmental ceremonies and 
proclamations, Scalia labeled the majority’s approach as “psychology practiced by 
amateurs,” and its conclusion that state officials coerced students to participate in the 
graduation invocation and benediction as “incoherent.”211    
4.  Lemon’s Interment—Kiryas Joel 
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet212 presented 
a highly unusual, and altogether unique, factual setting.  The Village of Kiryas Joel, 
in Orange County, New York, consisted entirely of members and practitioners of 
Satmar Hasidim, a sect of Judaism and strict adherents to the Torah, a practice that 
required its members, among other things, to segregate the sexes outside the home, 
to speak Yiddish as its primary language, to dress in distinctive garb, and to eschew 
most aspects of modern society, such as television, radio, and English-language print 
publications.  Following World War II, surviving members of the sect moved from 
Europe and relocated to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.  
Thereafter, in 1974, the Satmars purchased an approved but undeveloped subdivision 
in the town of Monroe, and assembled a community that eventually became the 
Village of Kiryas Joel.213  
Because of their separationist lifestyle, the Satmars formed their private religious 
schools outside the auspices of the Monroe-Woodbury school district, namely, the 
United Talmudic Academy for males and the Bais Rochel for females.  These 
schools, however, offered no special services for handicapped children, who, 
statewide, were entitled to special education services regardless of whether they were 
otherwise enrolled in private schools.  Although the Monroe-Woodbury school 
district provided such special education for the schoolchildren of Kiryas Joel at an 
annex at the Bais Rochel location, the district discontinued this practice in 1985.214  
As a result, the Kiryas Joel children who needed special education were forced to 
                                                                
209 Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
210 Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 and Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790). 
211 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
212 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
213 Id. at 690-91. 
214 Id. at 691-92.  Specifically, the district discontinued this practice in response to two 
Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and 
Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).  Aguilar held unconstitutional New 
York City’s practice of paying the salaries of public school teachers who provided remedial 
services in parochial school settings.  Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404, 414.  Ball invalidated Grand 
Rapid’s practice of utilizing nonpublic school facilities, at public expense, to provide 
instruction by teachers who were paid wholly or partly out of public funds.  Ball,473 U.S. at 
375, 398. 
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receive such services at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools.  However, most of 
these children, already burdened by various physical, mental, or emotional disorders, 
suffered severe trauma through their exposure to the outside environment.215   
Eventually, the school district sought a declaratory judgment in state court as to 
whether state law barred it from providing special education services outside the 
district’s regular public schools.  The New York Court of Appeals concluded that 
state law permitted Monroe to establish a separate public school within the Village, 
but that Free Exercise considerations did not require such separate school.  In 
response, the New York State Assembly enacted enabling legislation that established 
the Village of Kiryas Joel as a separate school district, with “all the powers and 
duties of a union free school district.”216  The statute also “empowered a locally 
elected board of education to take such action as opening schools and closing them, 
hiring teachers, prescribing textbooks, establishing disciplinary rules, and raising 
property taxes to fund operations.”217  The legislation thus addressed the “‘unique 
problem’ associated with providing special education services to handicapped 
children in the village.”218 
Eventually, various groups challenged the Kiryas Joel school district under the 
New York and Federal Constitutions as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.  
The state trial court found the enabling statute unconstitutional under all three prongs 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman.219  A divided state appeals court affirmed, holding that the 
statute at issue had the primary effect of advancing religion, in violation of Lemon’s 
second prong.  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal question, 
holding that the statute “created a ‘symbolic union of church and State’ that was 
‘likely to be perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of their religious 
choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval’ of their own,” thereby vesting the 
statute with the primary effect of advancing religious belief.220 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in another highly fractured opinion, held the 
statute at issue violated the Establishment Clause.  Specifically, the majority, 
authored by Justice Souter, concluded that the statute creating the Kiryas Joel School 
District delegated the state’s discretionary authority over public schools “to a group 
defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context 
that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised 
neutrally.”221  As such, the majority concluded that the statute at issue transgressed 
the Establishment Clause, which “compels the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ 
                                                                
215 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692. 
216 Id. at 693 (citing 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748). 
217 Id. (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 1709 (McKinney 1988)). 
218 Id. (quoting then New York Governor Mario Cuomo). 
219 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
220 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 695 (citing 81 N.Y.2d 518, 529).   
221 Id. at 696. 
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toward religion,”222 favoring neither one religion over another, nor collectively 
favoring religious adherents over nonadherents. 
The Court characterized the law as “an unusual and special legislative Act,” and 
acknowledged that the statute itself did not delegate power based on religious belief 
or religious practice, nor did it delegate power to be used in accordance with 
religious beliefs, but rather, delegated power to establish a school district to a village 
that happened to be populated entirely by members of the Satmar Hasidic sect.223  
Because of this circumstance, the majority concluded that the statute “effectively 
identifies these recipients of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal 
adherence, even though it does not do so expressly.” 224  The Court then found this 
circumstance to constitute forbidden “fusion of government and religious 
functions.”225   
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion discussed at length the competing 
concepts of neutrality, accommodation, and equal protection that the case presented.  
O’Connor’s recitation of the myriad of tests developed by the Court, not just for 
Establishment Clause cases, but for Free Speech cases and Equal Protection cases, 
bears note.  She recognized that “setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases 
may sometimes do more harm than good,” and “shoehorning new problems into a 
test that does not reflect the special concerns raised” by any particular case “tends to 
deform the language of the test.”226 
Justice Scalia authored the dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas joined.  Scalia began his dissent with his usual vigor:  
[T]he Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the 
Establishment Clause—which they designed ‘to insure that no one 
powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental 
power to punish dissenters,’—has been employed to prohibit 
characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the 
religious practices (or more precisely, cultural particularities) of a tiny 
minority sect.  I, however, am not surprised.  Once this Court has 
                                                                
222 Id. at 696 (citing Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 
792-93 (1973),  and Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104). 
223 Id. at 699. 
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 702.  While the majority went to great lengths to characterize the formation of the 
village of Kiryas Joel as a religious endeavor, its analysis overlooks one crucial point—the 
state action at issue was designedly narrow to suit the needs of one small sect, and not to 
“establish” a state religion.  See id. at 691.  In fact, the statute did quite the opposite—rather 
than establish a state religion, it allowed one established religion to govern itself.  See id.  Any 
“delegation” of political authority to the sect was a delegation to be used by that sect and 
applicable only to that sect, thus taking the analysis completely out of the establishment realm.  
See id. at 691-92.  The law at issue was not of general applicability, nor did it authorize 
members of one religion to exercise any type of authority over nonmembers nor encumber 
nonadherents; it did not make them political outsiders, nor did it occasion any coercion, 
psychological or otherwise, upon any dissenting group, Christian, atheist, or Jew alike.  See id. 
226 Id. at 718-19. 
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abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling 
religious toleration the establishment of religion.227  
Scalia accused the majority of “steamrolling” and “collapsing” the special 
circumstances present in the case, and characterized the majority’s holding as 
“breathtaking.”228  To Scalia, the majority’s position amounted to the “novel 
proposition” that political power, appropriately vested in any group of citizens, could 
somehow become divested under the Establishment Clause where such group of 
citizens, by design or happenstance, shared the same, or even similar, religious 
beliefs.229  Scalia likened this approach to a wholesale disfavoring of religion as 
religion, through the divestment of political power in a group purely on account of 
religious beliefs, “positively antagonistic to the purposes of the Religion Clauses.”230  
Scalia predicted that the majority would have “lauded” the legislation had it 
delegated the power to create a special school district on account of cultural 
differences occasioned by the parents of the schoolchildren being “nonreligious 
commune dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies”; Scalia refused to see any 
contrary result mandated by cultural differences occasioned by religious belief.231  In 
this respect, Scalia concluded that the law was facially neutral, and not religiously 
motivated.   
D.  The Wall Razed? 
1.  The Merging of the Disparate—Rosenberger and Neutrality 
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
232
 the Court 
once again abandoned coercion and apparently merged all Establishment Clause 
analyses with the concept of neutrality.  Rosenberger involved a University of 
Virginia policy that permitted the payment of printing costs of various student 
publications.  Specifically, as part of its program to support extracurricular student 
activities on campus, the University allowed student groups to organize as 
“Contracted Independent Organizations,” (“CIOs”).  All CIOs enjoyed access to 
                                                                
227 Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
228 Id. at 735, 737. 
229 Id. at 736.  Scalia concluded that the majority’s approach would likely render the states 
of Utah and New Mexico unconstitutional at the time of their admission into the union, as 
residents of these states were predominantly Mormon and Roman Catholic, respectively.  Id. 
230 Id.  Scalia did not accuse the majority of disfavoring the Satmar religion; however, he 
did accuse the majority of failing to recognize that invalidation of vested political power—
solely because such political power becomes vested in people sharing the same religious 
belief, and not on account of the belief but on account of the lifestyle accompanying such 
belief—is tantamount to disallowing political power in any group of citizens who happen to 
share common religious beliefs: “I see no reason why it is any less pernicious to deprive a 
group rather than an individual of its rights simply because of its religious beliefs.”  Id. at 737. 
231 Id. at 741. 
232 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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University facilities, including meeting rooms and computer terminals, but remained 
otherwise unaffiliated with the University.233  
 While all CIOs attained recognition by the University, selected CIOs were also 
eligible to apply for financial support from the Student Activities Fund (“SAF”).  
The SAF existed to support a broad range of extracurricular activities “related to the 
educational purpose of the University,” and the University Guidelines required that it 
operate “in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University as 
well as with state and federal law.”234  The SAF received its funding via a mandatory 
$14.00 fee assessed to each full-time student of the University.   
University rules limited eligibility for SAF funds to eleven categories of student 
groups, among them being “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or 
academic communications media groups.”235  University guidelines also excluded the 
reimbursement of costs related to certain CIO activities that would otherwise be 
eligible for SAF funds.  Thus, an otherwise eligible CIO could not seek 
reimbursement for the costs of engaging in “religious activities, philanthropic 
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the 
University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar 
fees, or social entertainment or related expenses.”236  Whereas a “political activity” 
comprised only those activities involving “electioneering and lobbying,” a “religious 
activity” was not so limited, but rather comprised “any activity that ‘primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate 
reality.’”237    
Petitioners’ organization, Wide Awake Productions (“WAP”), published a 
newspaper, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia.238  
The impetus of this newspaper, and in fact the underlying reason for WAP’s 
existence, was to publish and disseminate a magazine that expressed philosophical 
and religious viewpoints from a Christian perspective, to foster an atmosphere of 
“sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints” and to “provide a unifying 
focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.”239  From the inaugural issue, 
WAP’s newspaper expressed manifestly Christian viewpoints, among them being its 
mission to “offer[] a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues, 
especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia,” and “to 
challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim 
and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ 
means.”240  The inaugural issue also included articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, 
stress, prayer, C.S. Lewis’ ideas about evil and free will, and reviews of religious 
                                                                
233 Id. at 823. 
234 Id. at 824 (citations omitted). 
235 Id. (citations omitted). 
236 Id. at 825. 
237 Id. (citation omitted). 
238 Id. at 825-26. 
239 Id. at 826 (citation omitted). 
240 Id. (citations omitted). 
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music.  Subsequent issues featured articles about homosexuality, missionary work, 
and eating disorders, as well as more music reviews and interviews with professors.  
An accompanying cross marked the end of each article.241    
An otherwise eligible CIO,242 WAP applied for SAF funds with respect to the 
costs associated with printing its newspaper.  The Appropriations Committee of the 
Student Council denied the request on the grounds that Wide Awake constituted a 
“religious activity” as defined under the Guidelines.  WAP appealed the decision to 
the full student Counsel, contending that it met all applicable Guidelines for SAF 
support and that denial of such support violated the Constitution.  The Student 
Council denied the appeal without comment, and WAP appealed to the Student 
Activities Committee.  In a letter signed by the Dean of Students, the Committee 
upheld the denial of funding.243   
Following the ruling of the Committee—the highest level of appeal within the 
University structure—WAP, among other parties, filed suit in United States District 
Court, alleging that the denial of SAF funding, based entirely on the viewpoint 
expressed in its newspaper, violated WAP’s rights to freedom of speech and the 
press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal protection of the law.244  The 
district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the University, ruling 
that denial of SAF support did not constitute impermissible content or viewpoint 
discrimination against WAP’s speech, and that the University’s concomitant 
Establishment Clause concern over SAF funding for WAP’s “religious activities” 
justified the denial of payment for printing costs to third-party contractors.245  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and concluded that the Guidelines 
did discriminate on the basis of content, but nevertheless upheld the district court, 
finding that the refusal to permit SAF funding served a “compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and state,” and therefore necessary to avoid 
an Establishment Clause violation.246  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both 
issues.  
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.  After concluding that the 
Guideline barring SAF funding for “religious activities” amounted to viewpoint 
discrimination, both on its face and as applied,247 the Court turned to the question of 
                                                                
241 Id. 
242 Despite its asserted Christian perspective, WAP attained CIO status soon after its 
formation.  Id.  The University did not contend that WAP qualified as a “religious 
organization” under University Guidelines.  Id. 
243 Id. at 827. 
244 The parties brought their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id.  Petitioners also 
brought several claims under Virginia law, but did not pursue those claims on appeal.  Id. at 
827. 
245 Id. at 827-28. 
246 Id. at 828. 
247 Id. at 831-37.  While the Court acknowledged that in a general sense, religious material 
as such would comprise a distinct body of thought or subject matter, to which the prohibition 
of content discrimination (barring all religious discussion) would apply, the Court concluded 
that to bar religious discussion, or discussion from a religious perspective, of subjects that 
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whether allowing SAF-funded reimbursement to WAP printing contractors would 
violate the Establishment Clause.248  At the outset, the Court treated the case as a 
typical “government benefits to religion” case, where the establishment scrutiny 
would focus on whether the criteria determining the receipt of such benefits, and the 
receipt of the benefits themselves, flowed from neutral policies and fell upon groups 
whose ideologies and viewpoints remained broad and diverse, even though some 
benefits might aid religious groups. 
The Court found the University’s SAF funding program to be neutral, in that it 
provided funding for any CIO constituting a “student news, information, opinion, 
entertainment, or academic communications media group[],” of which WAP 
belonged,249 notwithstanding proscription on funding expenses incurred in “religious 
activities.”  The Court concluded that WAP sought SAF funding as a student news 
and opinion journal rather than on account of its Christian viewpoint.  News and 
opinion from a Christian standpoint is still news and opinion, of which the 
Guidelines permitted funding.  Likewise, the student fees imposed to support the 
SAF went to fund expenditures, in furtherance of the goal of disseminating a wide 
variety of ideas, insofar as “student expression is an integral part of the University’s 
educational mission.”250  SAF funds were not used to support religion, but rather to 
support the dissemination of news and opinion from a Christian perspective, much as 
the SAF would be available to any other CIO that disseminated news and opinion 
from any other perspective.    
Justice Thomas’ concurrence chastised the dissent for its mischaracterization of 
the original meaning of Establishment Clause and its “misleading application of 
history [that] yields a principle . . . inconsistent with our Nation’s long tradition of 
allowing religious adherents to participate on equal terms in neutral government 
programs.”251  Thomas interpreted James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance 
                                                          
themselves encompass general topics—such as reproduction, abortion, homosexuality, or 
death (subjects capable of discussion from a perhaps infinite number of philosophical or 
religious standpoints, be they Christian, Muslim, Hegelian, Kierkegaardian, Marxist, etc.)—
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, and therefore “an egregious form of content 
discrimination.”  Id. at 829. 
248 The University actually abandoned this argument before the Supreme Court; 
nonetheless, the Court ruled upon the issue inasmuch as the court of appeals had based its 
decision on Establishment Clause grounds.  Id. at 837. 
249 Id. at 840. 
250 Id. The Court noted that the fee imposed was not designed to support the government, 
but to support academic and education-related activities of students.  Id.  In this respect, the 
Court refused to conclude that the student fee was a “tax” exacted by the government for the 
support of religion, or was a direct money payment to an institution engaged in religious 
activities to support those activities.  Id. at 840-41.  Nor did the Court rule that the fee 
qualified as public money.  Id. at 841.  In this vein, the Court also declined to address the issue 
of whether a dissenting student who opposes particular speech funded by the $14.00 fee would 
have a First Amendment right to seek a pro-rata return of that portion of his or her exacted fee 
expended for the speech to which he or she objects.  Id. 
251 Id. at 852-53. 
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Against Religious Assessments252 not as evidence that government must not prefer 
religion over irreligion (thus barring all forms of monetary assessments that might 
happen to benefit religious entities), but rather, as Madison’s view that government 
may not bestow favor upon certain religious sects to the exclusion of others, wherein 
“intolerance, bigotry, unenlightenment and persecution” generally result.253  For 
Thomas, the Establishment Clause simply did not proscribe state programs directly 
aiding religious activity when such aid is a part of a neutral program available to a 
wide variety of participants,254 true whether such benefit came in the form of 
governmentally-funded facilities or in the form of government funds themselves.255   
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, placed particular scrutiny upon the overall 
nature of WAP’s newspaper, which he characterized as both a newspaper 
disseminating informative articles and opinion from a Christian perspective, and also 
a device of proselytization, a publication that at its core spread a message of 
Christian orthodoxy, exhorting sinners to repentance and to the salvation made 
available through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.256  Based upon this 
conclusion, Souter categorically rejected the notion of any state-sponsored or state-
funded subsidization of such a publication as absolutely forbidden under the 
Establishment Clause.  The dissent, like Thomas, cited Madison’s Remonstrance, but 
reached a different conclusion therefrom: that the Establishment Clause, as indicated 
by history, disallowed all forms of governmental support for religion.257  With this 
conclusion, the dissent stated that “evenhandedness” in the doling out of government 
benefits could not of itself suffice to permit the direct financial support for religious 
proselytization, even where such benefits are made available on a neutral basis and 
subject to neutral criteria.258 
                                                                
252 For an informative discussion, see generally Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and 
works cited therein.  Id. at 852-63. 
253 Id. at 856. 
254 Id. at 857-58.  Here, Thomas falls prey to imprecision, much like the dissent, by 
substituting “religious” for “religion” and in equating “religious activity” with religion.  Id.  
While direct government aid to religious activity that has sectarian overtones might implicate 
the Establishment Clause where such aid is pervasive and funded by government mandate, 
“religious activity” that might receive some governmental benefit cannot, as a matter of law, 
constitute an Establishment of religion because it is not religion and is not establishment.  See 
infra Part IV.B. 
255 Such aid might come in the form of various tax exemptions or credits for religious 
institutions, being tantamount to a tax-funded government subsidy.  Id. at 859-61. 
256 Id. at 865-66.  In reaching this conclusion, the dissent gave particular significance to the 
doctrinal statements contained throughout the newspaper, even to its masthead, which bore 
Paul’s exhortation in his Epistle to the Romans for believers to awake from their slumber 
“because our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed.”   Id. at 865. 
257 Id. at 869 n.1. 
258 Id. at 881-83.  The “central analysis” became not the neutrality of the evenhandedness 
of the funding itself, but rather upon whether the funding, if general, went to secular functions 
that could be separated from the overall sectarian nature of the institution such as “sufficiently 
to ensure that aid would flow to the secular alone.”  Id. at 884. 
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2.  The Incoherent and Inchoate Mass of Approaches—Santa Fe 
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,259 the Court examined the 
practice of the Santa Fe Independent School District that permitted Santa Fe High 
School to deliver a prayer over the public address system before every varsity 
football game, a prayer recited by an elected student council chaplain.  Two sets of 
students—one Catholic and one Mormon—challenged this practice in district court.  
During the pendency of the proceedings, the District amended its prayer policy to 
allow that such prayer would be voluntary from the standpoint that (1) the student 
council, under the advice and direction of the high school principal, would conduct 
an initial election process whereby the entire student body would vote by secret 
ballot as to whether a pre-game invocation260 would occur before all varsity football 
games, and (2) if the student body voted that such an invocation would occur, the 
student body would then elect a student from a list of student volunteers who would 
deliver such invocation.261  The content of the invocation itself was left to the 
discretion of the student delivering the invocation, “consistent with the goals and 
purposes” of the amended policy.262  
The district court eventually enjoined application of the rewritten policy, finding 
that the rewritten policy, on its face, effectively coerced student participation in a 
religious event, i.e., a sectarian prayer over the public address system at varsity 
football games.263  Both the School District and the Doe parties appealed this 
decision, the School District arguing that the enjoined portion of the rewritten policy 
was permissible, and the Does contending that both the rewritten and the original 
policies violated the Establishment Clause.  A majority of the court of appeals agreed 
with the Does, striking down both versions of the policy as applied to high school 
sporting events.264  The Supreme Court granted the School District’s petition for 
certiorari on the following question: “‘Whether petitioner’s policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment 
Clause.’”265  
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, upheld the ruling of the court 
of appeals.  Stevens citied Lee v. Weisman for the general proposition that 
government may not coerce support or participation in religion, or the exercise 
                                                                
259 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
260 Id. at 294-98.  The Court’s opinion indicates that the word “prayer” was removed from 
the policy and replaced with references to “messages,” “statements,” and/or “invocations,” 
although it is not clear from the opinion the context in which these words appeared.  Id. at 298. 
261 Id. at 298 n.6.  The policy as amended contained a failsafe option of sorts, where, if a 
court enjoined application of the re-written policy, the policy would revert to a previously-
existing policy that provided essentially the same terms except that the content of any 
invocation was to be “nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.”  Id. at 297. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 299.  Apparently, the policy at issue also applied to varsity baseball games as 
well.  Id. 
264 Id. at 299-300. 
265 Id. at 301. 
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thereof, “or otherwise act in which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or 
tends to do so.’”266  Stevens then rejected the School District’s argument that the 
invocations in question would constitute “private” speech by the students, and 
therefore not attributable to the government under an Establishment Clause analysis, 
but additionally protected under the Free Speech and Free Exercise provisions of the 
First Amendment.  In so rejecting, the Court refused to qualify the type of speech 
involved as that occurring in Rosenberger, i.e., individual/private speech within a 
governmentally-established limited public forum, but rather, as governmentally-
sponsored speech within a forum controlled by the school district, allowing access 
thereto to only one student, who would perform the invocations under guidelines 
established by the school system and specifically created for that very speech.267 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of distorting existing 
precedent and further demonstrating an overall “hostility to all things religious in 
public life.”268  Rehnquist also expressed disagreement with what he perceived as the 
majority’s cutting with too wide a swath in its facial invalidation, stating that 
“[w]hile there is an exception to this principle [of the general refusal to render 
wholly invalid a policy based on hypothetical or future contingencies] in the First 
Amendment overbreadth context . . . no similar justification [exists] for 
Establishment Clause cases.”269   
3.  A Beast with Two Heads—Van Orden and McCreary County 
In 2005, the Supreme Court issued two simultaneous rulings, Van Orden v. 
Perry270 and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky271  
Collectively, these rulings represent the continuing division existing within the 
Court, its most recent fracturing, and its most extreme display of the tensions 
existing between the neutrality model and the history and traditions model of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.272  Van Orden involved an Establishment 
Clause challenge brought by residents of the State of Texas seeking to enjoin the 
                                                                
266 Id. at 302. 
267 Id. at 303-04.  The Court acknowledged that these factors, standing alone, were not of 
themselves determinative of whether the speech involved was private speech or government 
speech; however, the Court concluded that, such factors taken together, and when coupled 
with the fact that the speech at issue would be determined by majority vote, created a 
mechanism of choosing speech—a mechanism set forth in the district’s policy—that by 
definition silenced any dissenting or minority opinions, thereby creating not a limited public 
forum but, rather, a forum where only preferred speech would occur—thereby making the 
invocation government-sponsored speech.  Id. at 304. 
268 Id. at 318. 
269 Id.  
270 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
271 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
272 Since these cases were decided, three members of the Court were replaced: Chief 
Justice Rehnquist passed away and was replaced by current Chief Justice John Roberts; Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor retired and was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito; and Justice David 
Souter retired and was replaced by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. 
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display of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.  The 
challenged display stood as a monolithic structure, six feet high and three and a half 
feet wide.  In 1961, the State accepted the monument as a donation by the Fraternal 
Order of Eagles of Texas, a national social, civic, and patriotic organization.  While 
the State selected the location of the monument, the Eagles of Texas paid the cost of 
erecting the structure, the dedication of which was presided over by two state 
legislators.273  In 2001, Petitioner Thomas Van Orden, an erstwhile attorney, sued the 
state under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking both declarative and injunctive relief, namely, a 
declaration that the maintenance of the monument violated the Establishment Clause 
and an injunction requiring its removal.  Following a bench trial, the district court 
held that the monument did not constitute an establishment of religion.  Specifically, 
the district court found (1) that Texas had a valid secular purpose in erecting the 
statue (as recognition and commendation of the Eagles for their efforts in reducing 
juvenile delinquency), and (2) that a reasonable observer, mindful of the history, 
purpose, and context of the monument, would not conclude that the monument, 
passive in nature and design, conveyed a message that the State was attempting to 
endorse religion.  The court of appeals affirmed with respect to both the purpose and 
effect analysis.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.274    
In affirming, the majority described its Establishment Clause jurisprudence as 
“Januslike,” one face examining the history and traditions of the country, the other 
affixing its gaze upon the dangers to religious freedom posed by that government 
intervention in religious matters.275  To the majority, Establishment Clause analysis 
necessitated consideration of both faces to the extent that “[o]ur institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being, yet . . . must not press religious observances upon their 
citizens.”276  Achieving a reconciliation of the two “requires that we neither abdicate 
our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a 
hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our 
religious heritage.”277 
                                                                
273 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82. 
274 Id. at 682-83.  While not evident from the Court’s opinion, the rationale applied by the 
court of appeals amounted to some conjunctively disjunctive form of Lemon, where 
endorsement and neutrality became sub-divisions of the purpose and effect prong of Lemon.  
See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177-78 (5th Cir. 2003). 
275 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683.  Again, threats to religious freedom find defense in the 
Free Exercise Clause.  As posited herein, the threats to free exercise must always be present 
where establishment is called into question.  The protections afforded by Free Exercise are 
greater, not lesser, than the protection afforded by Establishment, to the extent that Free 
Exercise protections are broader reaching and will afford protection even where no 
establishment exists; however, as posited, there can be no establishment without an 
accompanying, and in fact preceding or conjoining, free exercise infringement.  Where no free 
exercise threat exists, ipso facto, no establishment can exist. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 683-84.  Rehnquist’s opinion rejected the Court’s primary assumption, stemming 
from Everson, that the Establishment Clause forbids any governmental preference to religion 
over irreligion, given the Court’s longstanding principles of acknowledgement, preferences, or 
accommodations of religion.  Id. at 687-88.  Here, then, is where any government hostility 
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While not rejecting Lemon, the majority declared it “not useful” with respect to 
the “passive” monument erected on Capitol grounds.278  Instead, the majority’s 
analysis was driven by the overall nature of the monument itself as well as the 
history and traditions of the nation.279  The majority viewed the monument as an 
acknowledgment of the role the Ten Commandments has played in the Nation’s 
heritage; the majority found similar longstanding monuments not only to the Ten 
Commandments, but to the acknowledgment of God and other religious themes in 
general, interspersed throughout Washington, D.C. itself.280  Furthermore, the 
majority reviewed the historical recognition the Decalogue played in all branches of 
government, such displays and recognitions “bespeak[ing] the rich American 
tradition of religious acknowledgments.”281 
The majority then turned to the nature of the monument itself, recognizing that 
the Ten Commandments, as a religious matter, imbibed the monument with religious 
significance.  However, the nature of the Ten Commandments, as contained within 
the Mosaic law, also bore historical and social significance, apart from its status as 
embodiment of religious principles; 282 to the majority, the mere imbuing of a symbol 
with religious content, or its accompanying capability of conveying or promoting 
some message consistent with religious doctrine, would not of itself strip it of any 
overall non-religious meaning, and would not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.283  Notwithstanding this general principle, the majority also recognized limits 
implicitly placed upon the government’s use or acknowledgment of religious 
symbols, such as laws mandating their placement in a public school setting where 
such law evinces a “plainly religious purpose.”284  Thus, given the setting in which a 
religious symbol would be placed285—in elementary schools versus legislative 
                                                          
toward religion would require a Free Exercise examination of whether the hostility rose to the 
level of a law prohibiting the free exercise. 
278 Id. at 686. 
279 Id.  
280 Id. at 688-89. 
281 Id. at 690. 
282 Id.  Similar monuments, be they statues, plaques, inscriptions on buildings, or some 
other form, all might in some sense, at least with the Ten Commandments, or Decalogue, 
acknowledge the religious item as a symbol for a more general idea or concept.  “Conceptual 
symbolism” it could be called, whereby we use either the Ten Commandments or an image of 
the Greek Goddess Themis to represent a nonreligious ideal, be it justice, or mercy, or 
judgment. 
283 Id. at 690.   
284 Id.  The Court recognized its particular vigilance over Establishment Clause concerns 
occurring within the confines of elementary and secondary schools.  Id. at 691. 
285 Conditioning the meaning behind the use of religious symbols, or other religious 
acknowledgments, might prove expedient, but it is equally unsound; a symbol as such cannot 
have meaning apart from that ascribed to it by society.  If society chooses a symbol to stand 
for a concept or principle, then that symbol must remain so regardless of its surroundings.  The 
Ten Commandments on the Courthouse walls mean the same as in school buildings. 
46https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/4
2009] A NEW ORIGINALISM 749 
 
chambers—such symbol may in fact serve as a passive tool of proselytization.286  
The Court therefore concluded that displaying the Ten Commandments, having both 
religious and nonreligious connotations, and given its placement, served as a passive 
symbol, falling far short thereby of violating the Establishment Clause. 287 
Scalia’s concurrence reiterated his often-stated position that the Court adopt a 
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence “in accord with our Nation’s past and 
present practices,” the salient feature of which being “that there is nothing 
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through 
public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the 
Ten Commandments.”288  Justice Thomas concurred in full but stressed his 
jurisprudential theory of original meaning, in terms of establishment as necessarily 
displaying “actual legal coercion” such as “mandatory observance or mandatory 
payment of taxes to support ministers,” or some other method of compulsory 
observance of religious doctrine.289  For Thomas, the Court’s Establishment clause 
approach “elevates the trivial to the proverbial ‘federal case,’ by making benign 
signs and postings subject to challenge,” and provides “no principled way” to 
determine the existence of religious significance at all, or by which to measure the 
line separating acknowledgment from establishment.290  In this way, the 
“incoherence of the Court’s decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause 
impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.” 291 
Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence noted at the outset that the clarity sought by 
Thomas could not be achieved by application of a “precise” formula, and that resort 
must be made to the overall purposes of the Religion Clauses, those being assurance 
of the “fullest possible scope of religious liberty” and avoidance of “that divisiveness 
based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government 
and religion alike.”292  In furtherance of these ends, “government must ‘neither 
                                                                
286 It seems doubtful, for Establishment Clause purposes, that any proselytization can be 
passive; likewise, no Establishment can be passive.  It cannot arise by circumstance, but by 
will.  It is imposed, not occasioned. 
287 Id. at 691-92. 
288 Id. at 692. 
289 Id. at 693-94.  Justice Thomas also espoused a position that the Establishment Clause’s 
text and history “‘resis[t] incorporation’ against the States” via the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. at 693. 
290 Id. at 694. 
291 Id. at 694-95.  The Court has never even attempted to formulate any “principled 
approach” to the determination of “religion” as embodied by the Establishment Clause.  While 
Justice Thomas seeks a principled way to separate the religious from the nonreligious 
significance with respect to “benign signs and postings,” or between the acknowledgment 
versus the establishment of religion, he misses the mark entirely in terms of clear 
constitutional text.  What is required is a principled approach with which to determine and 
differentiate “religion” (and a violation if established) with “religious,” which even if 
“established” under current precedent, nonetheless presents no Establishment Clause problem.  
See infra Part IV. 
292 Id. at 698. 
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engage in nor compel religious practices,’” nor must it “‘effect . . . favoritism among 
sects or between religion and nonreligion,” nor must it “‘work deterrence of [any] 
religious belief.’”293  While Breyer seemed to consider neutrality alone as an 
“insufficient” touchstone, he also concluded that the Court’s other tests could not 
“readily explain the Establishment Clause’s tolerance, for example, of the prayers 
that open legislative meetings . . . ”;294 he nevertheless acknowledged that where “the 
relation between government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual 
hostility and suspicion, one will inevitably [encounter] borderline cases.”295 
A companion case, McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky
296
 likewise involved 
the posting of the Ten Commandments on government property, albeit in two 
Kentucky County Courthouses, one located in McCreary County and one in Pulaski 
County, Kentucky.  Unlike Van Orden, however, and with almost a mirror opposite 
of voting blocks, the Court concluded that the posting of the Ten Commandments 
violated the Establishment Clause.   
Each County displayed the Commandments in large gold-framed wall hangings: 
McCreary County hung the display pursuant to an actual order by the County 
legislature to do so, while Pulaski County ceremonially hung the display in the 
presence of, and at the apparent behest of, the County Judge-Executive, accompanied 
by his church pastor.  Both Counties’ displays contained an abridged rendition of the 
Ten Commandments as found in the King James version of the Holy Bible, including 
a citation to Exodus 20:3-17, and were readily visible by any person conducting 
business at the respective courthouses.297  Eventually, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Kentucky, among others, challenged both displays in federal district court. 
During the pendency of that lawsuit, both Counties passed resolutions authorizing 
a second, more expansive display.  Each County resolution declared the Ten 
Commandments to be “‘the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal 
codes of . . . Kentucky are founded,’. . . that ‘the Ten Commandments are codified in 
Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws,’” and various other statements evincing the 
importance of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky’s past.298  The expanded 
displays, along with the Ten Commandments, contained a second display of eight 
other documents in smaller frames, each having some form of an historical or 
government declaration recognizing God, prayer, or the Bible.299   
                                                                
293 Id. (citations omitted).   
294 Id. at 698-99 (citations omitted).  What the Court’s test may not explain, the clear text 
of the Establishment Clause out of which these tests arose does: Legislative prayer is by no 
means “religion” in a hard sense, nor is it “establishment” by force of law. 
295 Id. at 700.  While no “test” can abate all possibility of borderline cases (those cases 
requiring fact-intensive analysis), a test that adheres to, rather than merely explicates or 
enhances, the text of the Constitution as primary, without supplantation, displacement, and 
substitution or addition, remains the only viable and consistent option in deciding these 
borderline cases. 
296 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
297 Id. at 851-52. 
298 Id. at 853. 
299 Id. at 853-54. 
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Following the assembly of the expanded displays, the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction against both displays, ordering their immediate removal.  In 
doing so, the district court applied Lemon’s three part test, finding that the displays 
lacked any secular purpose.  Both Counties filed notices of appeal from the 
injunction, but dismissed the appeals after acquiring new legal counsel.  Thereafter, 
both Counties enacted new displays, entitled “The Foundations of American Law 
and Government Display,” containing an expanded version of the Ten 
Commandments, alongside other legal documents such as the Magna Carta, the Bill 
of Rights, and the Kentucky Constitution, as well as a picture of Lady Justice.  A 
statement describing the historical and legal significance accompanied each 
document.300  The ACLU moved to supplement the previous injunction to include the 
third display, and the Counties responded with renewed arguments that the displays 
had a valid educational purpose.  The district court disagreed and broadened the 
injunction to include the third displays.  Both Counties appealed, and a divided panel 
of the circuit court upheld the district court, holding that despite the inclusion of 
other secular documents alongside the Ten Commandments, their “‘lack of a 
demonstrated analytical or historical connection’” to the Ten Commandments, 
evinced an impermissible religious purpose behind the display.301  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 
Justice Souter, writing for a five-member majority, relied primarily on the 
Court’s per curiam decision in Stone v. Graham302 in holding that the counties’ 
display of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause.  Stone 
involved a Kentucky state law that required the posting of the Ten Commandments 
in all public school classrooms.  The Stone Court labeled the Ten Commandments an 
“instrument of religion” and concluded that their presence in public school 
classrooms, devoid of any accompanying secular theme, lacked a secular educational 
purpose, thereby constituting an advance of religion.303  Souter recognized that Stone 
did not stand for a per se proscription of any governmental display of the 
Commandments, necessitating a consideration of the overall context in which such a 
display occurs.  Souter found two overarching similarities between the displays at 
issue and the display in Stone: (1) both displays set out the actual text of the 
Decalogue, as opposed to some symbolic representation thereof,304 and (2) each 
                                                                
300 Id. at 855-57. 
301 Id. at 856-58.  Only one judge of the majority also found that the display violated the 
effects prong in that “a reasonable observer would find that the display had the effect of 
endorsing religion given the lack of analytical connection between the Commandments and 
the other documents in the display, the courthouse location of the display, and the history of 
the displays.”  Id. at 858 n.8. 
302 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
303 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 867 (citing Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 n.3). 
304 Id. at 868.  Such symbolic representation might depict “10 roman numerals, which 
could be seen as alluding to a general notion of law, not a sectarian conception of faith.”  Id.  
This suggestion transforms the Court into a national art critic; moreover, it suggests the 
ridiculous, as the very force of the Ten Commandments as a symbol of law exists and arises 
within and from the text of the Commandments themselves.  Such an “alternative” 
representation would be akin to suggesting that the government could denude or buffer the 
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stood alone rather than as a component of a larger secular display.305  In sum, any 
display of the actual text of the Ten Commandments, standing alone or absent 
“sequiturious” or  “logically connected” secular “buffers” interspersed throughout, 
became thereby “an unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious 
obligations and with morality subject to religious sanction.  When the government 
[endeavors] to place this statement alone in public view, a religious object is 
unmistakable.”306 
The majority then turned to the post-suit but pre-judgment 
alterations/modifications made to the displays at issue.  Because the government 
made these modifications during already pending legal proceedings, the Court 
deemed them insincere attempts to vest the displays with newfound historical, 
educational, and civic significance through the inclusion of countervailing secular 
material.  The Court determined these efforts disingenuous on their face, and 
substantively insufficient under the Establishment Clause.307   
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, concluded otherwise.  First, it argued 
against the majority’s conclusion that the Establishment Clause required complete 
government neutrality as to religion; second, it argued that the scope of the neutrality 
had been extended beyond any of the decisions reached in prior cases; and third, it 
argued that even where the principle of neutrality correctly considered as required 
under the Establishment Clause, the decision that the displays at issue violated the 
Establishment Clause was incorrect.308   
                                                          
Christian imagery inherent in Michelangelo’s Pieta only by substituting stick figures for Mary 
and the Christ.  Furthermore, this conclusion directly contradicts the “reasonable observer” 
approach to the effects/endorsement analysis, as certainly any reasonable observer of an image 
of stone tablets containing roman numerals I through X would understand that image to 
represent the Ten Commandments, an impermissible “instrument of religion” under Stone. 
305 Id.  The Court’s conclusion is troubling given that both courthouse displays included 
additional images; however, the Court reasoned that despite the presence of additional images, 
the placing of the Ten Commandments as central negated any presumption that the inclusion 
of secular images sufficed to integrate the Commandments into an overall secular display.  Id.  
It is difficult to imagine any scenario where the Ten Commandments would be so integrated 
into other disjointed secular imagery that the religiously moral purpose for its inclusion would 
be lost upon the viewer.     
306 Id. at 869.  If “morality subject to religious sanction” is one factor determinative of 
“religion” within the meaning of the Establishment Clause, then the Court would do well to 
include the concept of “sanction” as determinative of any “establishment” thereof.  
Furthermore, it would be hard to imagine any display of the Ten Commandments having any 
symbolic significance bereft of these essential elements; and so bereft, the symbol becomes 
stripped of the very concept it represents, rendering it meaningless and neutered. 
Also, the presence of an “unmistakable religious object” begs the question as to whether 
such “religious” object constitutes religion.  It does not.  Furthermore, any statements made by 
the object are statements not of the government, but those imbedded in history, statements that 
have in fact occurred millennia ago. 
307 Id. at 869-70.   
308 Id. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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IV.  GRAMMAR AND USAGE/LINGUISTIC MODALITY—A HERMENEUTICAL LODESTAR 
A.  Problems Inherent in Supertextual Approaches  
As discussed supra, the problems inherent in ignoring constitutional text manifest 
themselves through the creation, and sustainment, of surrogate standards that through 
continued use become surrogate “supertext” to the Constitution’s clear language and, 
therefore, supplant it.  When this results, the text itself becomes secondary, and in 
fact meaningless.  We have seen, as outlined above, the most extreme example of 
this supplantation in modern constitutional jurisprudence through the Court’s 
disjointed treatment of the Establishment Clause.  The “wall of separation” has so 
confounded the analysis because it has created the ultimate supertextual standard—
that of separation.  The word “separation,” of course, occurs nowhere within the First 
Amendment.  Furthermore, and more importantly, the surrogate concept of 
separation has forced the Court to craft and re-craft multiple, disjointed tests so as to 
accomplish its surrogate mandate of separation.309   
O’Connor’s separate concurring opinion in Kiryas Joel310 perfectly illustrates the 
problems inherent in super-constitutional “tests,” which tempt judicial proclivity to 
abandon clear constitutional text and to craft surrogate tests as definitive law rather 
than as a rule with which to construe that text.  Two problems arise: first, no Justice, 
or lower judge, would dream to declare that any given problem is being 
“shoehorned” into the language of the Constitution; second, and equally important, is 
that the language of tests often transcends the constitutional text and subordinates the 
meaning of that text to judicially-created law that by its very nature “acquire[s] more 
and more complicated definitions which stray ever further from their literal 
meaning.”311  If such is the necessary and unfortunate result of any particular test, 
then the complications and straying inherent in their creation render subordinate the 
actual language of the Constitution from which they, presumably, derive.   
Equally disturbing is the judicial rationale for justifying the need to develop 
multiple tests on the same subject, driven by some false judicial conviction that 
clauses such as the Establishment Clause “cannot easily be reduced to a single 
test.”312  This conclusion is anathema to the very nature underlying any constitution, 
or any statute—that the language of the law drives the meaning of the law, and is not 
merely some ornamental and symbolic springboard from which to develop abstract 
tests that are mere shadows of the law, and thereby supplant the law through 
application.  At some point, the test, however well-intentioned, transcends the law 
such that the analysis begins and ends with the language of the test, not the law.  
When this happens, the law itself becomes transformed, or in the case of the 
Establishment Clause, supplanted by multiple and disparate tests; O’Connor’s 
admonishment then rings true, that courts, “[r]ather than taking the opportunity to 
                                                                
309 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803-13 (1983). 
310 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
311 Id. at 719 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
312 Id. at 720. 
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derive narrower, more precise tests from the case law, . . . tend to continually try to 
patch up the broad test, making it more and more amorphous and distorted.”313  
It strains credulity to accept as a notion of constitutional interpretation that 
disparate tests can be derived from the same source, or that different tests can govern 
a singularly stated proscription.  There is, however, one rationale that may explain 
such a proclivity: the usurpation of judicial power so as to accomplish an outcome 
that satisfies the Court’s quest for a just result.  Thus, where the text of the 
Establishment Clause does not fit neatly into the desired result, it is ignored, 
broadened, substituted, supplanted, so as to achieve such result; and because the 
desired result—that of separation—is equally super-textual, the language of the law 
can never lead to the desired outcome. 
1.  Lemon/Endorsement Model 
In Lemon, the Court posited that the proscription against an establishment 
included any “step towards” establishment, apparently construing the meaning of the 
term “respecting” as “nearing” or “approaching,” thereby broadening by substitution 
the prohibition against laws respecting establishment.314  Moreover, the Court treated 
the term “respecting” as modifying “establishment of religion” rather than “law,” the 
result of which mandated a separation of government from religion as opposed to the 
proscription of laws respecting establishment.315  In this analysis, the explicit 
requirement of “law” dilutes to the point of inconsequentiality, and “religion” 
expands into the realm of anything remotely “religious.” 
The methodology cannot sustain itself nor can it remain cohesive.  A law may 
respect religion but not establish religion, and yet under Lemon, government conduct 
respecting a religious topic would perforce constitute a law approaching an 
establishment of religion and a violation.  Under this methodology, establishment 
becomes engulfed by all judicial notions of what “approaches” it.  In other words, 
because the Lemon test expands the ambit of the term “respecting,” it thereby 
expands both the noun it modifies, “law,” and its object, “establishment of religion.”   
Furthermore, Lemon’s three sub-classes of ways a law can “respect” religion—
purpose, effect, and entanglement—essentially eliminate the distinction between 
“religious” and “religion.”316  So as can be applied to any given case, the government 
may pass a law (or undertake a policy) with a clear religious effect, such as the 
erection of a cross on government grounds.  Because a cross is a religious symbol, 
the policy would have the effect of appearing to advance the Christian religion, and 
fall squarely within the prohibitions of Lemon.  However, the act of erecting the 
cross, whether by law or policy, is by no means a law respecting an establishment.  
The detachment from text, however, allows for the analysis to stray into the “step 
toward” establishment realm, and also allows “religious” symbols to achieve a type 
of “conceptual symbolism” where the symbol becomes the concept, where the 
religious becomes the religion.  Therefore, because the act of erecting a cross on 
                                                                
313 Id.  
314 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
315 Id. at 612. 
316 Id. at 612-13. 
52https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/4
2009] A NEW ORIGINALISM 755 
 
public property undoubtedly involves the creation of the conceptual symbolism of 
Christianity, the act itself becomes a “step towards” not only the erection of the 
symbol, but the creation, or establishment if you will, of the concept.  So, for the 
purposes of Lemon, the construction of a cross on government property would 
necessarily serve as a step toward Christianity, which would then become an act 
respecting Christianity.  While the erection of a cross does not establish Christianity, 
it is a conceptual symbol of the religion, and consequently, tantamount to the religion 
itself.  So under Lemon, the cross would violate the Establishment Clause while 
meeting neither of the operative words of the clause, i.e., it would be neither an 
establishment nor a religion. 
The advancement portion of Lemon’s “effects” prong has since become melded 
with the notion of “endorsement.”317  Whereas the concept of endorsement can occur 
both actively and passively, the concept of advancement, in a strict semantic sense, 
cannot classify as a passive activity.  As the Court itself has acknowledged, the term 
endorsement “is not self-defining,” hence the need to utilize even broader analysis 
that perforce acquires even greater disconnection from constitutional text.318  This 
disconnectedness displays most clearly when the Court, as in Allegheny, stated that 
“[w]hether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential 
principle remains the same.”319  From a textual standpoint, this conclusion is 
ludicrous.   The “key word” and “essential principle” in any constitutional analysis 
must be words and principles chosen by the drafters and included therein; and for 
Establishment Clause analysis, the key word must remain “establishment,” and the 
essential principle, “establishment of religion.”    
A law “fostering” an “excessive entanglement” with religion likewise constitutes 
a law respecting an establishment of religion, even if it has a secular purpose and 
neither advances or inhibits religion.  Again, this test imposes super-constitutional 
implicature serving as a surrogate for explicit text: “fostering” replaces “respecting,” 
and “entanglement” replaces “establishment.”  Equally disturbing is the Court’s 
substitution of ambiguous terms without attempting to establish any set of criteria 
with which to determine them; if the Court cannot fashion a definitive rule with 
which to determine establishment, how much less can it fashion a test with which to 
determine entanglement so excessive as to constitute an establishment?  Lemon’s 
continued existence, however, remains most troubling in that the Court has since 
developed additional “tests” that exist along some unsound continuum with 
Lemon.320  The obvious implication becomes, then, that the existence of 
multitudinous tests creates multiple, and disparate, Establishment Clauses.  No sound 
system of legal thought can ever support such a result.    
                                                                
317 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93. 
318 Id. at 593. 
319 Id. 
320 See Kristen M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring 
of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 PAC L.J. 121, 126, 144-45 (1995); Lambs Chapel 
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Kenneth M. Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New Establishment Clause 
Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1198-1203 (1984).     
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In Marsh v. Chambers, for example, Justice Brennan’s dissenting analysis 
reached beyond Lemon’s prongs and emphasized the principles of “separation” and 
“neutrality” that he found “implicit” in the Establishment Clause.321  Emerging from 
these “implicit” principles were still deeper implicit principles, “relevant” and yet 
that much further removed from actual text.  The first of such principles (which the 
dissent termed “purposes”) was what the dissent described as “to guarantee the 
individual right to conscience,” implicated not only when “the government engages 
in direct or indirect coercion” but also when “the government requires individuals to 
support the practices of a faith with which they do not agree.”322  A second such 
principle was “to keep the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of 
religious life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious issues or by 
unduly involving itself in the supervision of religious institutions or officials.”323  A 
third such principle was “to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by 
too close an attachment to the organs of government.”324  A fourth such principle was 
to “help assure that essentially religious issues, precisely because of their importance 
and sensitivity, not become the occasion for battle in the political arena.”325 
The Marsh dissent then went a step further, however.  Not only did it establish 
these nascent principles, but it then imbued them with an even further reaching arch, 
not only applying them “to the relationship of government to religious institutions or 
denominations” as a whole, but extending them “to the relationship of government to 
religious beliefs and practices,”326 all doing so with assurances that “this view of the 
Establishment Clause is [not] a recent concoction of an overreaching judiciary.”327 
However, even Lemon does not mandate that the law at issue be devoid of 
religious undertones or connotations, but rather, proscribes laws whose primary 
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.  There is a tremendous difference, both 
as a matter of normative meaning and usage, between “religious” and “religion.”  
These are not synonymous terms, nor can they be used interchangeably within the 
context of the Establishment Clause.328  However, this difference has never been 
                                                                
321 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 803-13 (1983).  Again, we see the process of substitution and the 
subsequent elevation of “implicit” terms over “explicit” ones, where implicit ideas achieve 
surrogate status as supertext of the Constitution. 
322 Id. at 803.  Of course, “coercion” has since become a second “test” by which the Court 
has addressed Establishment Clause issues, discussed infra Part IV.A.2. 
323 Id. at 803-04 (footnote omitted).  Certainly, a state often takes upon itself the decision 
to interfere with other “autonomies,” such as in the financial or economic realm (through 
compulsory taxation and regulation) or in the realm of the family.  Of course, such intrusion 
does not necessarily implicate anything contained in the Constitution guaranteeing such 
autonomy, except where the Court has engaged in the aforementioned addition of language, 
and the rights created thereby, i.e., “privacy” or “substantive due process.” 
324 Id. at 804. 
325 Id. at 805. 
326 Id. at 806. 
327 Id.   
328 Even the most cursory review of many Establishment Clause opinions reveals that the 
Court itself often uses these two terms interchangeably.    
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explicitly recognized or adequately addressed by the Court since the adoption of the 
Lemon test.  That is precisely because Lemon, being an ambiguous and  disjointed 
test, lends itself to such substitution of implicit terms for explicit ones, “religious” 
for “religion.”  A cross is religious; a menorah is religious; however, a cross is not 
part and parcel with Christianity, nor is a Menorah part and parcel with Judaism.329 
Endorsement as a constitutional principle, established in Allegheny, instructs that 
the government’s use of a religious symbol constitutes an unconstitutional step 
toward establishment if it has the effect of endorsing religious belief; and that such 
an effect is to be determined by the context in which such religious symbol appears.  
The Allegheny Court deemed these principles “sound.”330  Thus, the majority in 
Allegheny, at first blush, appeared to discard, or at least distance itself from, the 
Lemon standard, using not Lemon’s three pronged inquiry to evaluate state action but 
rather setting forth an examination as to the effect of the state action at issue, i.e., 
“whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived 
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the 
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’”331  This new 
endorsement approach, amazingly, both supplanted and supplemented Lemon from 
the standpoint that “endorsement” becomes both a stand-alone proposition and a 
surrogate for Lemon’s “effects” prong.332  Of course, since Lemon itself supplanted 
explicit text, endorsement analysis remains twice removed from that text. 
Furthermore, endorsement analysis, like Lemon, not only ignores the explicit 
requirement of “law” within the Establishment Clause, it in fact eliminates it.  Even 
the concept of “ceremonial deism”333 recognized as valid in such instances as “In 
God We Trust” on currency, “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” 
or “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, misses the mark set by the text of the 
First Amendment.  References to God on government property—however generic—
carry with them no force of law.  Presidential messages invoking the Almighty or 
imploring prayer in times of crisis may offend agnostic or atheistic sensibilities, but 
they in no way establish religion in the sense that they mandate adherence under 
penalty of law to a particular creed or orthodoxy.  Under endorsement, the focus 
                                                                
329 Indeed, even the Christian cross itself takes many forms, depending on the particular 
branch of Christianity using it.  The orthodox cross is markedly different than, say, the Latin 
cross (the traditional cross used by Western Christianity), or even the Roman Catholic 
crucifix, which, by definition, has affixed to it the corpus of Christ to denote his suffering.   
330 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597, 668.  The Court thus shifts a focus not to government 
action—an “active” establishment—but to the general perception created by that action, where 
the reasonable observer could in effect create a “passive” establishment because he or she 
merely perceived an establishment.  Or, in the case of judicially created and extra-
constitutional tests that supplant text, the reasonable observer could declare an endorsement 
(“passive endorsement”) where no such endorsement was undertaken (“active endorsement”).  
See id. at 620.  The dissent termed this shift in focus a “most unwelcome[] addition to our 
tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”  Id. at 668. 
331 Id. at 597 (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 390).  It should be noted here that the Court 
eventually overturned Ball in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 203 (1997). 
332 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97. 
333 Id. at 603. 
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shifts to the result of the government action, and not the action itself; therefore, a 
crèche erected on city property might be deemed an endorsement even in the absence 
of a “law” requiring such display. 
Furthermore, the “jurisprudence of minutiae” that results from the subjective 
context required by endorsement analysis “demands the Court to draw exquisite 
distinctions from fine detail in a wide range of cases.”334  Moreover, the examination 
as to whether the government’s use of a religious symbol in a holiday display, as in 
Allegheny, is permissible given the lack of “reasonable alternatives that are less 
religious in nature” inherently fails because “it requires not only that the Court 
engage in the unfamiliar task of deciding whether a particular alternative symbol is 
more or less religious, but also whether the alternative would ‘look out of place.’”335  
The very essence of the endorsement test, “with its emphasis on the feelings of the 
objective observer, easily lends itself” to the type of inquiry” into the social 
prominence enjoyed by any particular strand of religion receiving government 
acknowledgment, which depending on the degree of prominence, would determine 
whether such acknowledgment rises to the level of endorsement.336  This type of 
inquiry produces the unintended result that “[t]hose religions enjoying the largest 
following must be [relegated] to the status of least-favored faiths so as to avoid any 
possible risk of offending members of minority religions.”337  The Court becomes, in 
this respect, an arbiter not of law, but of social sensitivity. 
2.  Coercion Model 
Coercion analysis also proves problematic.  Allegheny’s dissent recognized the 
coercive aspects inherent, and in fact necessary, for government action to constitute 
“law,” but nevertheless distinguished between direct coercion—for example, 
compelling observance of the Sabbath, imposing special taxes to support religious 
institutions, or requiring public officials to declare allegiance to the Pope in order to 
hold public office—and indirect, symbolic, or “passive” recognition of religion: the 
former would amount to a per se violation of the Establishment Clause, while the 
latter, save for extreme cases,338 would at most bestow some “intangible” benefit to 
religion that is either “ensconced in the safety of national tradition” or “unlikely” to 
pose a realistic risk of establishment.339   
Thus, the two guiding principles emerging from the Allegheny dissent appear to 
be: (1) government may not directly coerce any participation or nonparticipation in 
religion; and (2) government may not, through adoption or recognition of religious 
                                                                
334 Id. at 676 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment & dissenting in part). 
335 Id. at 676-77 (internal citations omitted). 
336 Id. at 677. 
337 Id. 
338 The Court cited as an example of such an extreme case a city that permitted the 
permanent erection of a Latin cross on the roof of city hall, not as a per se violation but rather 
one that would “place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on 
behalf of a particular religion.”  Id. at 607. 
339 Id. at 661-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
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symbols, concepts, or traditions, place its aegis upon selected religions or faiths, or 
religion in general to the exclusion of nonreligion so as to amount to an indirect 
coercion by proselytization.340  Indirect proselytization would occur in instances 
where the government recognition or assistance confers an undue benefit on religion.  
Such undue benefit does not occur in the context of legislative chaplains (Marsh), 
public sponsorship of religious displays at Christmas (Lynch), provision of school 
transportation to parochial schools (Everson), or tax exemptions for religious 
organizations (Walz).341 
The analysis undertaken in Lee v. Weisman examined activity occasioned at the 
invitation of public officials and, as it occurred within the context of public school 
graduation, cloaked with an “obligatory” or mandatory component.342  The Court 
made clear that the practice of including clergy-lead prayers at these graduations did 
not implicate, or require, Free Exercise accommodation analysis under Lemon, and 
stated that: “[t]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of 
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.”343  The Court found the state action at issue constituted 
“pervasive,” and impermissible, government involvement in religious activity,344 “to 
the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a 
public school,” which circumstance the Court deemed determinative of the issue 
before it, without resort to Lemon, or endorsement.345   
The Weisman Court, while reciting coercion, also made the error of equating 
religious with religion, and nonsectarian prayer with Establishment.  Just as matters 
of conscience, morality, and faith—perhaps inextricably tied to religion in a general 
sense—do not by their relation thereto transform or overtake their object, 
supplications for divine guidance do not become proclamations of the divine, and 
what the divine is, to whom the divine reveals, or for whom the divine intercedes.  
                                                                
340 Id. at 659-63. 
341 Id. at 662-63. 
342 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586.  The majority reached this conclusion notwithstanding its 
acknowledgement that the school district did not require attendance at graduation as a 
condition for receipt of a diploma.  See id.  
343 Id. at 587.  As discussed infra, Free Exercise accommodation, without more, could 
never supercede Establishment Clause limitations.  
344 Again, the Court examines “religious activity,” as opposed to religion, thereby skirting 
explicit constitutional text and cloaking such text with superceding extra-constitutional 
doctrine.  See id. at 586.  The Court also equated the State methods for including such 
prayer—the choice by the principal—to a State statute mandating that such prayers take place.  
See id. at 587.  The expansion of constitutional text in this respect cannot be reconciled with 
the traditional concept of “law” as compulsory state action. 
345 Id. at 587.  Here Justice Kennedy attempts to delve into the consciousness or the mental 
state of the hypothetical attendee, thereby making the subjective perception of a single 
observer determinative of an Establishment of Religion; what makes this mode of analysis 
most disturbing is the fact that Kennedy himself rejected such subjective touchstone in his 
Allegheny dissent.  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s subjective approach in Weisman betrays 
what he identified in Allegheny as the “imperative of applying neutral principles in 
constitutional adjudication.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 676.   
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While Weisman recognized the inherent tension between the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause, it mistook the display or exercise of the trappings of 
religion for religion itself.346  The Madisonian system and its dichotomy of majority-
based laws and constitutionally-protected rights invite a tyranny of the majority 
through legislative fiat and a tyranny of the minority through judicial largesse.  
Madison himself, cited by the majority, was concerned not so much with the 
trappings of religion, or the religious, as with the “ecclesiastical establishments” that 
ultimately defile, and not preserve, “the purity and efficacy of Religion.”347  
Nevertheless, the Weisman Court apparently declined to differentiate things 
“religious” from the overall concept of “religion.”348 
The Court also distinguished its decision in Marsh given the “[i]nherent 
differences between the public school system and a session of a state legislature,” 
where the latter involves adults who are “free to enter and leave with little comment 
and for any number of reasons,” who are, unlike the former, not confronted with the 
choice to remain and comply or to boycott and thereby bypass “the one school event 
most important for the student to attend,” a ceremony where family and friends come 
together “to celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all 
to the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and 
duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts.”349   
                                                                
346 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592 (“What to most believers may seem nothing more than a 
reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context 
may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the 
State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”).  The “inherent tension” between Free Exercise and 
Establishment exists as a result of Court-created tests, not from the language of the First 
Amendment. 
347 Id. at 590 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (W. Rachal, R. Rutland, B. Ripel, & 
F. Teute eds. 1973)). 
348 The Court drew a distinction between sectarian notions of religion and what it termed a 
“civic” religion, or in other words, expressions of faith that do not rise to the level of 
sectarianism or creeds, be they invocations of a generic or unidentified divinity, or higher 
power, or otherwise non-offensive universal notions of “God.”  Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589.  
The Court nevertheless struck down civic religion as violative of the Establishment Clause, 
where the mere absence of a specific creed could not neutralize the idea of God from its 
religious origins.  See id.  Of course, such distinction begs the question of whether any 
expression of religious content, be it prayer, or acknowledgement of a religious holiday, is (1) 
a law; (2) a law respecting establishment; or (3) a law respecting an establishment of religion, 
civic or otherwise.  In this respect, the notion of a generic reference to a religious holiday such 
as Christmas, with both religious and non-religious criteria, as permissible (as found in 
Allegheny) cannot be reconciled with the generic notions of God in a commencement 
ceremony, both of which involve non-establishment. 
349 Id. at 595-97.  The majority’s reasoning here might be more germane to the traditional 
negligence approach to the law, where age and maturity often determine the duty and requisite 
standard of care governed thereby; however, as matter of constitutional adjudication, where 
the Establishment stands as an absolute, and not a relative, prohibition, such an approach 
creates tiers or levels of scrutiny that again are themselves both foreign to and antagonistic 
towards the clear text. 
58https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/4
2009] A NEW ORIGINALISM 761 
 
Justice Souter’s logic in his concurrence in Weisman yields an interesting result 
in terms of his analysis between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause, where he states that if coercion should be the test for Establishment Clause 
cases, such a standard would effectively eviscerate the Free Exercise Clause, in that 
“laws that coerce nonadherents to ‘support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise’ . . . would virtually by definition violate their right to religious free 
exercise.”350  Thus, Souter concludes that coercion, as an implied element of the Free 
Exercise Clause, need not be a predicate upon which an Establishment Clause 
violation would be based.  Justice Souter rejected the notion that requiring absolute 
governmental neutrality in matters of religion was irreconcilable with the 
accommodation required by the Free Exercise Clause.  While government 
accommodation “must lift a discernable burden on the free exercise of religion,”351 
any act of government that purported to accommodate religion by acting in an area 
not otherwise burdened would amount to endorsement and thus a violation.   
Justice Souter’s analysis is incorrect.  All establishments, if they be 
establishments, must infringe upon free exercise; there can be no establishment 
violation without an accompanying free exercise violation.  Requiring coercion for 
an establishment analysis in no way eviscerates the protections afforded by free 
exercise; it clarifies them.  As discussed infra, the placement of the participial 
phrases indicate the first as the most extreme, and the second as less extreme, such 
that government could infringe on free exercise without an accompanying 
establishment, but never the reverse.  Using coercion as a touchstone does not 
delimit Free Exercise analysis, which must afford more expansive protections such 
that the reach of its protections extends beyond establishment concerns.  Coercion 
then serves more as a model by which to determine whether a law respecting an 
establishment exists, and not merely whether an establishment is threatened.      
3.  Neutrality/History and Traditions Model 
Neutrality as a decisional test for Establishment Clause violations does not take 
into account the inherent characteristic that neutrality, with respect to religion, 
requires government passivity, while the only situations subject to Establishment 
Clause scrutiny necessarily involve government action.  Neutrality as an 
Establishment Clause determinative not only proves too much, but is most often a 
self-executing analysis.  Any law is government action; any law passed has some 
function; any practice involving anything remotely “religious” must perforce be 
motivated in some way upon the religious.  Too often, neutrality acts not as a 
constitutional standard, but some surreal examination driven by any number of 
extrinsic circumstances, ad infinitum, from the typeface of a sign posted on 
government property to the proximity of a monument to a government building.  Far 
from grounded in text, the standard becomes altogether separated from text, and 
governed more by personal aesthetics than linguistics. 
Souter’s concurring analysis in Weisman set forth his neutrality approach to the 
Establishment Clause, and displayed an “all or nothing” rationale, where the 
inclusion of any message or symbol with religious meaning, no matter how 
                                                                
350 Id. at 621 (citations omitted). 
351 Id. at 629. 
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denominationally neutral, would necessarily constitute government approval of 
religion over non-religion, or even religion over agnosticism; deism over atheism; 
belief over nonbelief.352  Souter also criticized what he identified as 
“‘nonpreferential’ state promotion of religion.”353  Nonpreferential promotion is an 
oxymoron, if not a contradiction in terms.  Promotion must involve advancement, to 
advocate one idea to the exclusion of others.  A nonpreferential promotion as such is 
not a promotion at all.  So something is either a promotion or it is not; if not a 
promotion, it must be nonpreferential.  If the aggressive separation requires the 
absence of any religious idea, that becomes tantamount to promotion of irreligion, 
which betrays neutrality.  Amazingly, while Souter affirms that the “text of the 
Clause” would not “readily permit” the adoption of a coercion test, he proceeds to 
declare that “[n]or does the extratextual evidence of original meaning stand so 
unequivocally at odds with the textual premise inherent in our existing precedent that 
we should fundamentally reconsider our course.”354  To Souter, while the “settled” 
precedent did not always establish “perfectly straight lines,” such precedent “cannot, 
however, support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a successful 
Establishment Clause claim.355 
Justice Souter’s analysis of the “extratextual evidence of original intent” results 
in a conclusion not supported even by his own examination of that evidence.  Justice 
Souter argues the changes made to the subject of the Establishment Clause evince the 
                                                                
352 Of course, the Establishment Clause speaks of law, and speaks of establishment, and 
not in terms of preferences, or inclusion, or acknowledgment.  Furthermore, proscriptions 
within the Constitution must be self-executing from the standpoint of being absolute: the 
Establishment Clause either bars State action in a certain area or it doesn’t.  Thus, given the 
rationale found in the Court’s precedent, and Souter’s interpretation of it, no exception can be 
made, such as in the motto “in God we trust,” or “under God,” no matter how ceremonial or 
perfunctory the invocation of such phrases might be. 
However, as neither practice is, in the proper sense, law, such practices are nevertheless 
not barred.  But the concept that any state action, pursued as a matter of tradition or ceremony 
and not law (as in the case of Weisman), involving recognition of religion, or the religious, 
somehow constitutes law as the framers understood the word “law” to mean, cannot be 
reconciled with the approach taken by either the majority or the concurring opinions in 
Weisman. 
353 Id. at 612. 
354 Id. at 618.  Apart from failing to identify this inherent textual premise, the supposition 
by Souter that “existing precedent” adhered to the clear text is, at best, unsustainable.  The 
precedent identified by Souter spoke of non-existent “walls of separation,” “entanglement,” 
“endorsement,” subtle or indirect coercion, “symbolic union of church and state,” terms not 
only “extratextual,” but supertextual, meaning, terms having replaced the text as the judicial 
touchstone of decision.  Id. at 609-31. 
Furthermore, no precedent identified by Souter, or any of the majority in Weisman, 
identified any textual premise, inherent or otherwise, with respect to what constitutes 
“religion” for Establishment Clause purposes.  In fact, all precedent and subsequent decisions 
have presupposed religion by the existence of any trapping thereof, be it reference to an 
“Almighty” or Divine providence, or a manger scene. 
355 Id. at 619. 
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Framers’ intent to make such proscription as broad as possible, to wit: changes in the 
phraseology, from “establishment of a religion” or “establishing religion” to 
“respecting an establishment of religion” required the Court to give the clause its 
broadest prohibitive effect.  However, while Justice Souter observes that earlier 
versions of the clause employed even more imprecise terms than “respecting,” such 
as “no laws touching religion,” he neglects to carry this logic forward to his 
conclusion; if “respecting” is deemed a more precise term than “touching,” then ipso 
facto, the framers meant just that, respecting.  Respecting is itself a present 
participle, meaning “on the subject of,” or “regarding.”  Any clear reading of the 
participial phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” would not include what 
Justice Souter identifies as the “features and incidents of establishment.”356 
In Kiryas Joel, the majority expanded the neutrality rationale and identified any 
perceived threat to government neutrality as one occurring not by virtue of the use 
made of such benefit, but by the very according of the benefit, or as the majority 
termed, the threat “at an antecedent stage.”357  This conclusion lacks any 
constitutional guidance.  The Establishment Clause speaks nothing as to future 
contingencies, or possibilities of future or contingent violations; nor has the Court 
ever invalidated a law based on some future unknown act by a legislative authority, 
one that may or may not adhere to the same standard of neutrality.358  In other words, 
the Court’s neutrality analysis, and the linchpin of any Establishment Clause 
violation based upon such analysis, hinges upon proving a negative, i.e., that the 
legislature would in fact not act consistently to carve out special legislation when 
faced with a comparable situation, be it a religious community or otherwise.359     
Because the majority determined that the benefit bestowed upon the village 
“flow[ed] only to a single sect,” it felt constrained to conclude that the statute 
                                                                
356 Id. at 622. 
357 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 702-03. 
358 This concern, if it be a concern at all, would perhaps more properly present an Equal 
Protection argument, as it would also present, in such a form as stated by the majority, a 
ripeness problem.  However, see the dissent: 
Making law (and making exceptions) one case at a time, whether through adjudication 
or through highly particularized rulemaking or legislation, violates, ex ante, no 
principle of fairness, equal protection, or neutrality simply because it does not 
announce in advance how all future cases (and all future exceptions) will be disposed 
of.  If it did, the manner of proceeding of this Court itself would be unconstitutional.  
It is presumptuous for this Court to impose—out of nowhere—an unheard-of 
prohibition against proceeding in this manner upon the Legislature of New York State.  
I have never heard of such a principle, nor has anyone else, nor will it ever be heard of 
again. 
Id. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
359 See id. at 703-04.  The proviso that government must act in a religiously neutral way, as 
a constitutional touchstone, would not necessarily implicate the Establishment Clause at all if 
the “future” community seeking special legislative treatment did so based on purely secular 
considerations.  For example, a community of environmentalists, existing as a municipal 
subdivision, might be delegated powers such that it could operate schools powered entirely by 
solar energy. 
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violated the Establishment Clause.360  In doing so, the majority was careful to 
reiterate that the Constitution permitted, and even mandated, accommodation of 
religion where the challenged law imposed special burdens upon the free exercise of 
that religion.  Despite recognizing the propriety of such accommodation in certain 
instances, the Court also reiterated that an “unconstitutional delegation of political 
power could [not] be saved as a religious accommodation.”361  The fatal infirmity of 
the New York statute lied in the fact that it singled out a particular sect for special 
treatment, therefore violating the requirement of neutrality.362  
Kiryas Joel, perhaps better than any other case, highlights the dangers of adopting 
super-textual approaches, and the always-accompanying specter of a result driven by 
application of such to unusual fact patterns.  For example, Justice Kennedy’s main 
criticism of the state action arose from New York’s creation of the school district by 
drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion.  Kennedy’s concern would 
appear to have greater weight if and when nonadherents would decide to relocate 
within the Village of Kiryas Joel, where imposition of such legislation against 
nonadherents would in fact meet all criteria of the Establishment Clause: a law, an 
establishment, and a religion.363  However, the thrust of Kennedy’s opinion 
concentrates more on the concept of religious accommodation than it does on 
establishment; his criticism of the state action at issue involved the use of religion as 
a criterion with which to draw political or electoral boundaries, and not the 
establishment of the Satmar religion itself.364 
In Rosenberger, the Court applied neutrality to a “government benefits to 
religion” case, where Establishment Clause scrutiny has traditionally fallen upon any 
government program that benefits a religious group, or religion in general, or where 
                                                                
360 Id. at 705.  Justice Blackmun noted as much in his brief concurrence, where he wrote 
separately to express his “disagreement with any suggestion that today’s decision signals a 
departure from the principles described in Lemon.”  Id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring).   
361 Id. at 706. 
362 Id. at 706-07.  The majority hinted that its holding did not foreclose other “alternatives” 
for providing bilingual and bicultural special education to Satmar children that adhered to 
neutral principles.  This statement further demonstrates the Court’s rudderless approach to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, where it appears to impose a “strict scrutiny”/“narrowly 
tailored” standard, as it would for violations of equal protection, or for content-based speech 
restrictions.  
363 Such a conclusion is difficult to ascertain in a vacuum, however, especially given the 
concept of establishment mandated by law, where adherence is enforced or nonadherence 
punished under penalty of law.  Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
364 Kennedy’s analysis focused on similarity of future action with respect to neutrality; 
however, it makes no mention that the electoral boundaries drawn by the statute affected only 
the very religion targeted by the statute.  See id. at 722-32.  Thus, no coercion can exist where 
there is no dissenting class to coerce—where all citizens of the challenged law are adherents, 
no endorsement or coercion can, by definition, occur, and nor does that danger exist unless 
and until nonadherents become subject to the law.  The infirmity of the law at issue, then, lies 
in its prospective application under as yet unascertained, and in large part unascertainable, 
scenarios. 
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religion or religious views are “implicated [to] some degree.”365  In such cases, the 
Court is mindful that in enforcing the Establishment Clause, it does not foreclose the 
government from extending the same benefits to religious groups that are made 
generally available to the public, without regard to religious belief.  To this end, the 
Court has required that such extension of benefits be based upon neutral principles or 
criteria, and remain generally available based on such neutral principles 
notwithstanding the fact that they aid or benefit religious groups or individuals.366  
However, in these types of cases, the Court has also recognized a “conflicting” 
principle—that the extension of government benefits might conceptually reach such 
a pervasive level or extent as to amount to an establishment of religion.   
Resolution of these conflicting principles requires a line-drawing based on 
particular facts; however, such line drawing must occur with reference to a fixed 
point, that being the text of the Constitution.  O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Rosenberger surmised that such line drawing (which she equated to “careful 
judgment”) is required when “two principles [(Free Exercise and Establishment)], of 
equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable conflict.”367  
O’Connor’s “unavoidable conflict” comes not from the language of the First 
Amendment, but from the multiple and inconsistent tests created to give them effect.     
This being the case, the Court’s decision in Santa Fe represents the most muddled 
and inconsistent Establishment Clause analysis the Court has ever undertaken, in 
large part because the Court seemed to apply all of its crafted approaches, none to 
                                                                
365 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839. 
366 Id.  This method of constitutional adjudication appears nearly incomprehensible when 
measured against the actual text of the Establishment Clause.  While extending financial or 
other government benefits to one religion to the exclusion of others may necessarily precede 
an establishment by law, or might be an aggregate indicia of such establishment, or must occur 
in conjunction with an establishment, such availability, even if not neutrally applied, cannot of 
itself constitute a law respecting an establishment because there is no accompanying free 
exercise problem.  All establishment problems must carry with them a concomitant free 
exercise problem.   
If neutrality, as an Establishment Clause requirement, prohibits government from taking 
any action implicating anything religious, the Establishment Clause as written ceases to exist 
as law.  While an establishment perforce requires a government preference for religion or for a 
particular religious belief (which, of course, would lack any neutrality at law), the reverse does 
not, as a matter of logic, follow.  Government preference on matters of religion, especially in 
the realm of conceptual representations of larger ideals such as justice, equality, or morality 
(be it government preference to have such ideal ethics, depicted in religious rather than secular 
terms—be it displays of the Ten Commandments, the Beatitudes, or the writings of Augustine 
over secular displays depicting the Greek goddess Themis, the writings of Aristotle, Justinian, 
or Blackstone, or the text of The Laws of Solon, the Roman Twelve Tables, Hadrian’s Law, or 
any other secular source of law or morality),  or in the realm of recognition of religion’s 
cultural or historical significance to the people of our nation (be it a government preference for 
Christmas displays including religious themes of the nativity, or a Menorah, or with themes 
relating to Kwanzaa, over the secular, commercialized Christmas displays of Santa Clause) 
cannot of itself determine establishment because such preferences interfere with no aspect of 
one’s private right to believe or disbelieve. 
367 Id. at 849. 
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the exclusion of the other.  While at the outset of its opinion the Court cited Weisman 
and its coercion approach, it proceeded to examine the school district’s policy of 
student-led invocation as one “endorsing” religion; it also cited the district’s 
“entanglement” with what it categorized as the “religious message” necessarily 
involved in any “invocation.”  The Court then reverted back to an endorsement 
analysis, inquiring as to whether anyone present at the pre-game invocation (and 
acquainted with the text of the policy, its history, and its implementation) would 
perceive the student-led invocation as a school-approved prayer.368  Concluding its 
jurisprudential vacillation, the majority undertook the coercion analysis with which it 
began its opinion, concluding that the policy at issue had instigated an electoral 
process where minority opinion on a religious issue—invocation—would necessarily 
become subjugated to the majority will, thereby inviting coercion.  The coercion thus 
descended upon any minority present at such invocation occurred by virtue of the 
natural desires and perceived social pressure to further school spirit, such as 
attending football games, as well as the presence of students who may have no 
choice but to be there—cheerleaders, band members, or the football players 
themselves.369  Notwithstanding this, the majority nevertheless concluded that a 
psychological coercive effect would descend on anyone actually present during the 
invocation, even where their attendance was wholly voluntary.   
The battle between history-and-traditions and neutrality that took place in Van 
Orden and McCreary County demonstrates that neither test can accomplish 
uniformity of application in the context of the Establishment Clause.  Both Van 
Orden and McCreary involved displays of religious symbology, i.e., the Ten 
Commandments, on government property.  Yet the Court reached diametrically 
opposite results in each case.  In Van Orden, the majority applied history and 
traditions and found the display of the Ten Commandments permissible.370  In 
McCreary, the majority applied neutrality and invalidated the display.371  The only 
decisional significance emerging from these two cases appears to be that history-and-
traditions would allow displays of the Ten Commandments, and neutrality would 
not.  However, the extent to which either test should, or would, be utilized in a 
similar case remains elusive at best.   
For example, Van Orden’s dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, reached a 
determination that any preservation of “Jefferson’s metaphorical ‘wall of separation 
between church and state,’” or of the similar concept of “wholesome neutrality,” 
“create[s] a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public 
                                                                
368 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.  The majority rejected the district’s argument that the 
invocation was simply a means to “solemnize” the sporting event, reasoning that the district 
itself prescribed an “invocation” to occur, the nature of which would necessarily encompass a 
prayer.  Id. at 309. 
369 Id. at 310-12.  This analysis begs the question of whether any minority student would 
feel psychological coercion occasioned by the state when deciding whether to join the football 
team, cheerleading squad, or school marching band. 
370 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681. 
371 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850-51. 
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property,” and with respect to the Texas monument, mandated invalidation.372  In 
particular, the dissent felt that display of religious symbols on government property 
creates an impermissible risk of offending nonadherents and adherents alike, thereby 
encroaching the obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the religious 
sphere, as compelled by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.373   
Stevens thus indicated that the neutrality approach will pay scant deference to 
history and tradition, other than to acknowledge its “strong role” in American 
culture; in this respect, while delimiting the scope of the metaphorical wall would 
not require governments to “hide works of art or historic memorabilia from public 
view just because they also have religious significance,” the dissent categorized its 
deference to tradition as of “marginal relevance” to a monument that served as 
“official state endorsement of the message that there is one, and only one, God.”374  
Chiefly, Stevens found an overriding religious message from the fact that the 
Decalogue constitutes the actual word of God, who demands worship of Him alone, 
supreme above all other deities.375  Stevens found equally disturbing the actual 
version of the Ten Commandments used, which Stevens noted were not merely 
semantic differences, but differences (such as for example, the Sixth 
Commandment’s directive “thou shall not murder” versus “thou shall not kill”) upon 
which different sects of Judaism or Christianity might vigorously disagree.376  
Display of such sectarian text—a step beyond display of a religious symbol—on 
government property invokes not only a powerful presumption of invalidity, but in 
fact “enhances the religious content of its message” as somehow the official message 
of the State.377 
Stevens also discounted various expressions recognizing a divine being made by 
the Founding Fathers as constituting transient statements of each speaker’s 
individual beliefs not necessarily imbued with government endorsement, whereas 
“permanent placement of a textual religious display on state property . . . 
                                                                
372 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Here, the dissent effectively 
elevates metaphor over text.   
373 Id. at 709-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This approach presupposes a neutrality implicit 
within the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; however, as stated supra Part IV.A.3, any 
textual reading of the Clauses reveals neutrality implicit if the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 
any favoring of religion over irreligion, whereas the specific violation of Establishment 
necessarily requires something more, the preference between particular religions, or specific 
sects of a particular religion.    
374 Id. at 711-12.  One would wonder whether Texas’s posting of a replica of 
Michelangelo’s “David” or da Vinci’s “Last Supper” would constitute “official state 
endorsement” of Yahweh’s anointing on David as King, or of Jesus’ propitiatory atonement as 
Messiah. 
375 Id. at 716-17. Such declaration of supremacy and any perceived endorsement of 
monotheism in general would be rejected not only by atheists, but presumably, by Hindus, 
Buddhists, or adherents to ancient Greek mythology for that matter. 
376 Id. at 717-18 n.16. 
377 Id. at 721.  The monument is, of course, a passive and silent monolith; its message is 
static in nature in that it says the same thing as existed millennia ago. 
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amalgamates otherwise discordant individual views into a collective statement of 
government approval [that] never ceases to transmit itself to objecting viewers whose 
only choices are to accept the message or to ignore the offense by averting their 
gaze.”378  Moreover, these views, even if indicative of the Nation’s tradition as a 
“religious people,” were nevertheless absent from the Constitution’s text, and if 
taken selectively, “paint a misleading picture” as to the traditional role of religion in 
public life.379 
In the companion case of McCreary County, the majority, of which comprised the 
dissent in Van Orden, applied neutrality to invalidate the display of the Ten 
Commandments.  The majority described its neutrality imperative as follows: 
The prohibition on establishment covers a variety of issues from prayer in 
widely varying government settings, to financial aid for religious 
individuals and institutions, to comment on religious questions.  In these 
varied settings, issues of interpreting inexact Establishment Clause 
language, like difficult interpretive issues generally, arise from the tension 
of competing values, each constitutionally respectable, but none open to 
realization to the logical limit.380 
Apparently, the majority in McCreary settled upon neutrality as a reconciling 
interpretive tool because “tradeoffs are inevitable, and an elegant interpretive rule to 
draw the line in all the multifarious situations is not to be had.”381  Thus, to the 
majority, only the principle of neutrality remedied the “variety of interpretive 
problems” of the concepts of Free Exercise and Establishment, and as such, “has 
been helpful simply because it responds to one of the major concerns that prompted 
adoption of the Religion Clauses.”382  The majority conceded that neutrality would 
not provide precise guidance in all cases, could not resolve all marginal cases, nor 
remove from doubt all the dubious trappings on infringement, but nevertheless 
embraced neutrality as a “prudent way of keeping sight of something the Framers . . . 
thought important.”383  It also dismissed the dissent’s reliance on historical evidence 
                                                                
378 Id. at 723. 
379 Id. at 724.  Stevens proceeded to identify “nonconforming sentiments” with respect to 
the early colonists’s viewpoints regarding religious uniformity.  See id. at 724-25 n.23-26. 
380 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 875.  This characterization borders on indecipherable.  It 
is also unclear which part of the Establishment Clause—all twelve words of it—is inexact.   
381 Id.   
382 Id. at 875-76.  One may safely assume that the Framers were well aware of these 
“major concerns” when they drafted the First Amendment.  As well-educated men, and 
deliberate drafters, they certainly would have included neutrality in the Amendment if 
neutrality were the overriding goal—a sentence such as “Congress shall remain neutral in all 
matters involving religion, and shall make no law preferring any religion over other religions, 
or preferring religion over the absence of religion.”  Indeed, had this been the text of the 
Religion sentence, the Court’s multifarious tests might be more fitting a response to such 
language; and actually, the tests adopted would support the proposition that such alternative 
and “inexact” drafting had in fact occurred. 
383 Id. at 876.  Presumably, the Framers would have judges “keep in sight” the actual 
language employed in the First Amendment as paramount and determinative.  Furthermore, 
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as to the Framers’ understanding as inconclusive at best: the majority discussed 
evidence for both arguments: (1) that the principle of neutrality in Establishment 
concerns perhaps exceed the Framers’ understanding of the clause, and (2) that 
neutrality in fact comports with the Founders’ intent such as would invalidate even 
government acknowledgment of religion.384 
With respect to the first argument, the dissent cited numerous instances in which 
the Founders specifically referenced matters of religion, acknowledgement of a 
deity, affirmation in the belief of a divine being, or assent to the reference to such 
divinity ancillary to the conduct of government affairs/business.385  Given the case 
history cited by the dissent, in which government extended or bestowed benefits 
specifically to religion or only thereto—e.g., property tax exemptions (Walz), or 
permitting students to leave public school for the purpose of receiving religious 
instruction (Zorach)—the dissent concluded that any premise of absolute neutrality, 
that government cannot favor religion over irreligion, as “demonstrably false.”386  As 
concerns government acknowledgment of religious belief in general, “it is entirely 
clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits the 
disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the 
disregard of devout atheists”387 and that “[h]istorical practices thus demonstrate that 
                                                          
the citation from James Madison employed by the majority spoke of the “line of separation 
between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid 
collisions & doubts on unessential points,” when read in context of the entire letter, indicates 
Madison’s concerns—as apparently spoken in the Rev. Adams’s sermon—as to monetary 
support of religion by government.  Id.  See Letter from James Madison to Rev. Jasper Adams 
(1832), reprinted in JOHN F. WILSON & DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH AND STATE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: KEY DOCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY FROM THE PAST THREE 
CENTURIES 75-77 (Westview Press 3d ed. 2003) (1965).  Given Madison’s apparent concern 
with the intermingling of religion and public money, one is left to wonder whether Madison, 
in the context of this letter, would have considered the posting of the Ten Commandments on 
the walls of courthouses as just such an “unessential point.”  Nevertheless, the impetus of 
Madison’s letter to the Rev. Adams concerned the government’s direct monetary support of 
religion and not its passive recognition thereof. 
384 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 877-78.  The imperative of neutrality certainly provides 
no self-explicating guidance, nor is it apparent on its face, but requires still further deviation 
and separation from the textual requirement of establishment.  Further, the neutrality imposed 
requires, if nothing more, merely the inclusion of sufficient buffers within any display of 
religiously-significant imagery, which merely dilutes all messages.  An externally and 
artificially created neutrality is not neutrality at all, but dilution.  The majority acknowledged 
this by its concession that the Constitution contained no textual definition of Establishment; 
however, not only does neutrality cut a wider swath, it would be used to supplant explicit text 
with something not implicit within it.  See supra Part IV.A.3.  As for the majority’s assertion 
that “[n]o one contends that the prohibition of establishment stops at the designation of a 
national [or a state] church” see McCreary County, at 875, 885-912 (Scalia, J., dissenting).     
385 Id. at 886-89.   
386 Id. at 891-93.  These examples perfectly illustrate laws that violate the Free Exercise 
Clause but do not violate Establishment. 
387 Id. at 893.  Public acknowledgments of the Almighty or God by definition disregard 
polytheists or atheists, but do not violate the Establishment Clause.  Our religious 
acknowledgments may pay tribute to a Creator or a God, or to the Judeo-Christian tradition, so 
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there is a distance between acknowledgment of a single Creator and the 
establishment of a religion.”388  
With respect to the second argument, the dissent noted that neutrality “ratchets 
up” Lemon’s hostility to religion by allowing for investigation into legislative 
history, not for evidence of actual religious purpose itself, but rather as a means to 
unearth evidence with which to ascertain the very appearance of government 
purpose, to the reasonable observer, thereby allowing neutrality to be measured 
against not actual intent, but by the opinion of a objective observer.  Neutrality, then, 
in essence allows a “heckler’s veto,” or a substitution of judgment where direct 
evidence of purpose is nonexistent.  Such a standard creates an “odd jurisprudence” 
that “bases the unconstitutionality of a government practice that does not actually 
advance religion on the hopes of the government that it would do so,” and one where 
“the legitimacy of government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the 
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the 
action had the intent to advance religion.”389   
The sum total of these latest opinions demonstrates that both models fail in that 
they both require conclusions to be drawn based on perception.  History-and-
traditions produces fair disagreement among the men and women of the judiciary, 
depending on the particular interpretive lens through which decisional rationale 
emerges.  Likewise, neutrality is also subject to the perception of the judiciary as 
measured by a similar interpretive lens, through which, again, decisional rationale 
emerges.  Given the imprecision of such constitutional jurisprudence, and the judicial 
temptation to substitute perception for sound judgment, the diametrically opposite 
outcomes reached in Van Orden and McCreary become not only predictable, but a 
foregone conclusion.     
B.  Grammatic and Linguistic Modality—A New Originalism 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.390 
The “Establishment Clause,” as it is called, has suffered with this label.  The 
Establishment Clause is in fact not a clause at all, from the standpoint of grammar 
and usage: it exists as one of two participial adjectival phrases contained within one 
compound clause that might be more correctly called the “Religion Clause” of the 
                                                          
long as such acknowledgment does not advance that belief upon others or disparage 
nonbelievers.  Our religious tradition presupposes monotheism, and thus, public 
acknowledgment to God in that vein is valid.  Id. 
388 Id. at 894. 
389 Id. at 901 (citation omitted). 
390 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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First Amendment.  As such, it is part of a single unit, and not one of two independent 
and disparate clauses.391 
Grammatically, then, the First Amendment consists of one independent clause:  
“Congress shall make no law”; all parts that follow are, strictly speaking, adjectival 
phrases, not clauses: the adjectival participial phrases “respecting an establishment of 
religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” separated by a comma and 
joined by the conjunction “or,” form one singular unit, which I have termed the 
“Religion Clause,” and both modify “law.”  However, the remaining two adjectival 
participial phrases also modify “law”: (1) Congress shall make no law “abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press,” which sets forth a second independent 
prohibition as indicted by the semicolon that separates it from the following 
prohibition, and (2) Congress shall make no law “[abridging] the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and [the right] to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”392  From the standpoint of parallel sentence construction, these 
adjectival participles—respecting, prohibiting, and abridging—appear as a series of 
prohibitions in the same grammatical form, all modifying “law.”393 
Thus, the First Amendment, according to its parallel structure, as determined by 
its three adjectival participles—respecting, prohibiting, and abridging—sets forth 
three independent protections: protection against laws respecting an establishment of 
religion and laws prohibiting free exercise of religion; protection against laws 
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; and protection against laws 
abridging the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and the right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.  
So grammatically, reference to an “Establishment Clause” and a “Free Exercise 
Clause” within the First Amendment is not only incorrect, it also, erroneously, treats 
them as separate, stand alone clauses.  In reality, they are part of one larger “Religion 
Clause” each affording not competing, but complementary and even supplemental 
                                                                
391 See, e.g., Carolyn A. Deverich, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and the 
Free Exercise Dilemma: A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist Argument for the 
Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 BYU L. REV. 211 (2006). 
392 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Structurally, this portion of the First Amendment is somewhat 
awkward, as the phrase “the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances” is also the object of the present participle “abridging,” 
even though it is separated from its previous object, freedom of speech, etc., by a semi-colon, 
not a comma (thereby indicating that it would stand apart as its own unit) and does not restate 
the term “abridging” as would seem it should.  However, grammatically, this third prohibition 
as set forth after the second semicolon would make no sense within the First Amendment 
unless that phrase were implied to relate back to “abridging” as well.  Furthermore, the object 
of the present participle “abridging” is “right,” with the two prepositional adjectival phrases 
“to peaceably assemble” and “to petition the government for a redress of grievances” serving 
as modifiers of the object, “right,” even though the word “right” is not restated with respect to 
petitioning the government.   
393 Parallel structure within a sentence is a coordinate structure in which all coordinate 
parts are of the same grammatical form; in this instance, respecting, prohibiting, and abridging 
appear in parallel form as present participles.  As coordinate parts, they all relate back to the 
same noun, “law,” with the same grammatical functions, i.e., participial modifiers.  See 
MARTHA KOLLN, UNDERSTANDING ENGLISH GRAMMAR 401 (4th ed. 1994). 
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protections as they relate to “law.”  Furthermore, to speak of the “tension of 
competing values” (between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses) displays a 
misunderstanding and misapplication of the grammatical structure of the Religion 
Clause.  This perceived tension, then, presents difficulty in implementation, unless 
such clauses be read in pari materia, which is to say, within the entire contextual 
structure of the First Amendment. 
The two phrases “respecting an establishment of religion” and “prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof” stand as adjectival phrases (in that they do not contain a 
subject and a verb) written as present participles (“respecting” and “prohibiting”), 
which as participial phrases both contain an object that relates back to the term each 
modifies, those objects being “establishment” and “free exercise” (or more 
accurately, “exercise,” with “free” serving as an adjectival modifier), respectively.  
These two phrases then, grammatically, comprise a compound adjectival modifier of 
“law.”  The use of “thereof,” which relates back to “religion” as contained in the 
previous phrase, indicates that the two are linked, and in fact, that the foregoing 
“establishment” presents a subsisting prohibition more limited and precise than the 
following “prohibiting”; if in such phrases were disjunctive or unconnected phrases, 
the use of the pronominal adverb394 “thereof” in the free exercise portion would 
become ambiguous, and as such, misplaced.  Nor do these two phrases constitute the 
predicate of the sentence; they do not complete the action of the verb “shall make”; 
“law” completes the action.  Therefore, the two phrases are merely adjectival 
restrictive modifiers395 of law.  The Religion Clause may properly be diagrammed as 
                                                                
394 In English, a pronominal adverb is formed in replacement of a preposition (“of”) and a 
pronoun (“it”), which is a relative pronoun relating back to the noun (“religion”) by turning 
the latter into a locative adverb (“there”) and the former into a prepositional adverb and 
joining them in reverse order, hence “thereof.”  See http://www.allwords.com/word-
pronominal+adverb.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
395 A “restrictive modifier” serves as a modifier in a noun phrase (here, “law respecting an 
establishment” and “[law] prohibiting the free exercise”) whose function is to restrict the 
meaning of the noun (“law”).  A modifier is restrictive when it is needed to identify the 
referent of the headword (here, again, “law”).  A restrictive modifier is never set off by 
commas.  See KOLLN, supra note 393, at 404. 
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follows:396
 
 
Likewise, “law respecting” must have as its object “establishment,” i.e. 
“respecting” what?  In grammatical terms, “respecting an establishment of religion” 
is one sub-unit of the Religion Clause, and any analysis must begin with the whole of 
the clause and work backwards, thereby parsing its meaning from the sum of its 
parts, but not merely constructing such meaning as simply the product of the sum of 
its parts.  As a present participial phrase, it serves in this respect as an adjectival 
participial phrase, modifying “law.”  “Establishment” is the object of the present 
participle “respecting,” and the two cannot be separated—i.e., no analysis can be 
done on the participle itself without including the object, establishment.  
Furthermore, “law” effectively serves as the subject of the entire adjectival 
phrase/restrictive modifier “respecting an establishment of religion” such that the 
true “Establishment Clause” must read as “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”  While perhaps self-evident with respect to the language 
of the First Amendment, judicial treatment has not demonstrated such understanding, 
as the myriad tests developed to construe the Establishment phrase focus on the 
singular concepts of “respecting” and “establishment,” rather than upon the phrase 
“law respecting establishment of religion” as a single unit.”397   
Similarly, “of religion” is an adjectival prepositional phrase modifying 
“establishment,” such that any analysis of “establishment” cannot exclude or be done 
in a vacuum absent inclusion therein of the term religion.  None of these terms stand 
alone.  However, because they each modify the other individually and likewise as a 
                                                                
396 Gene Moutoux, Sentence Diagrams, One Way of Learning English Grammar: 
Sentences from the United States Constitution, http://www.geocities.com/gene_moutoux/ 
diagramamend1.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
397 See KOLLN, supra note 393, at 186. 
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unit serve as the restrictive modifier of “law,” one must approach the analysis as a 
type of sine qua non approach where each element must be present: is there religion?  
If so, is there an establishment?  Likewise, establishment is determined not by vague 
notions of “endorsement” or “entanglement,” but only with reference to “law;” and if 
there be law, is it one respecting an establishment?  True fidelity requires that any 
establishment analysis must include all three concepts—law, establishment, and 
religion—as these concepts comprise the entirety of the establishment portion of the 
Religious Clause.  Therefore, any proper textual analysis must encompass a two-
tiered approach, involving (1) the concepts of law, establishment, and religion as 
they exist within the entirety of the Religion Clause, and (2) a sine qua non approach 
that requires a finding of law, establishment, and religion as conjunctive, the absence 
of any one of which would thus require a finding of constitutionality.  The concepts 
of “law” and “establishment” within the Establishment Clause necessarily involve 
some form of legal favor or compulsion, where adherence or nonadherence to the 
particular creed at issue (i.e., establishment) is rewarded, compelled, or punished, 
respectively, through the granting of political favor, civil or criminal penalty, or 
sanction, or through some form of compulsory taxation (i.e., law).  However, 
“respecting” must be construed not with reference to “religion,” but with reference to 
“law,” such that a law respecting an establishment would necessarily involve a law, 
the primary purpose of which is to establish religion, and not merely recognize, aid, 
or promote religion in the general sense. 
The primary weakness with all the Court’s attempts to fashion a decisional 
standard lies in the fact that all analysis presupposes religion and focuses only on the 
notion of establishment; and any analysis of “respecting” points not back to “law,” 
but forward to “establishment.”  Moreover, the tests so fashioned stop not at 
establishment, but seek to ferret all perceived “steps toward” establishment.  This 
approach fails in that it misconstrues text.  A law respecting an establishment of 
religion cannot, from a textual and grammatical standpoint, become synonymous 
with a practice that might be considered a step toward establishment.  The Court’s 
previous approaches appear to consider that the term “respecting” modifies 
“establishment,” whereby establishment becomes a broadened concept, and a “near 
miss” of establishment is nevertheless an establishment.  Establishment as the object 
of the participial phrase completes the phrase, it does not relate back to “respecting,” 
but forward to “religion.”  If the text of the Constitution stated, perhaps, that 
“Congress shall make no law tending to respect an establishment of religion,” or one 
“respecting a tendency toward the establishment of religion,” then their myriad tests 
might prove closer to the mark.  However, the Constitution does not say such things.  
Respecting modifies and restricts “law,” i.e., a law respecting.  
However, any clear reading of the text of the Establishment Clause indicates that 
religion is also a “sine qua non” of the analysis; if the practice at issue is not religion, 
then further analysis must end, without reference to any establishment 
considerations.  Religion is not synonymous with the general idea of God or what 
may be considered as “religious” concepts—e.g., a graduation prayer, a moment of 
silence, statues of religious symbols, or the inclusion of “intelligent design” in public 
school curricula.  Religious symbols may, and in fact do, serve as symbolic 
expressions of concepts distinct from the religion from which they derive—concepts 
of justice, liberty, compassion, generosity, patience, etc.  Government would use 
such symbols for the universal meaning contained therein, as perhaps expressed or 
implied through their religious meaning in a context apart from their religious 
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significance, much like it could use the expression of such concepts by secular 
means, such as Hadrian’s Law, the writings of Epicurus or Kant, or Foucault’s 
theories of correction and punishment.    
This approach mirrors the jurisdictional approach in all federal courts, where, say, 
the concept of subject matter jurisdiction must exist regardless of the merits of the 
Plaintiff’s asserted claims.  Or, from the standpoint of state actions sounding in 
negligence, the elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages all must 
exist to maintain a tort action.  So if there be no duty, there can be no breach and 
proximate cause, and the action must fail regardless of the magnitude of damage.   
As such, textual fidelity mandates the analysis to include all three nouns within 
the clause: law, establishment, and religion.  Textual fidelity also requires assigning 
“hard” meaning to the terms “establishment” and “religion.”  Establishment may be 
the more ambiguous of the two, but neither escape conceptualization.  Each 
possesses certain immutable characteristics that courts may identify, and if any of 
these identified characteristics be lacking, then neither can be said to exist.  
Regarding “respecting,” the textual-linguistic approach makes clear the word itself 
links “law” with “establishment.”  Thus, for any establishment to exist, it must by 
necessity involve the force of law, which may be thought of as the compulsion to act 
or not act by the dictates of statute or regulation.  Government can act in such a way 
that might respect religion, but must always involve “law.”  Regarding “religion,” 
while it is true that religion in the specific sense may potentially encompass an 
endless variety of embodiments, the term itself is not ambiguous in the general sense 
of those characteristics that embody or define religion as a concept.  Religion 
promotes and establishes doctrine through canonical law and catechism.  Religion 
then espouses and enforces orthodoxy and demands adherence to such doctrine.  
Religion often recognizes a hierarchy of authority.  A de rigueur examination of the 
term may reveal that religion mandates orthodoxy; religion entails doctrine; religion 
espouses creeds.398  Religion preaches an identifiable and specific message, adheres 
to the teachings of a particular individual or group of individuals,399 and may 
venerate manifestations of divine beings,400 often collected in some sacred work or 
text.401  Religion may recognize some form of the afterlife involving reward or 
punishment, nonbeing, or reincarnation, and often requires official days of 
observation or observance.402  Moreover, these terms must be understood within the 
parameters of their context within the entire Religion Clause, first and foremost; 
these parameters exist by virtue of the Clause’s grammatical structure, which can 
only be gleaned through the rules of grammar and usage.     
This exegesis comports with current Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In District of 
Columbia v. Heller, the Court engaged in Second Amendment analysis employing a 
                                                                
398 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
399 E.g., Jesus, Moses, Mohammed, Buddha, St. Paul, John Smith, etc.  Even nontraditional 
or “new age” forms of religion, such as Scientology (L. Ron Hubbard) or Unification Church 
(Sun Myung Moon), adhere to this principle.   
400 E.g., God, Christ, Jehovah, Allah, Zeus, Vishnu, Isis, Zoroaster, etc. 
401 E.g., The Torah, the Gospels, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, etc. 
402 E.g., Christmas, Easter, Passover, Ramadan, etc. 
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linguistic approach as an interpretive principle in constitutional adjudication: “[W]e 
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by 
the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.”403  In fact, in Heller, the Court endeavored to 
break down the various subparts of the Second Amendment, separately analyzing 
each clause (or phrase as the case may be) within the overall context of the entire 
structure of the Amendment.  This approach is altogether proper, for it limits 
constitutional interpretation to the rules of English grammar—the rules that bound 
the Framers at the time of drafting—and thereby renders no word or phrase therein 
redundant or surplusage, further preventing subjugation and textual supplantation.  In 
this way, then, grammatical exegesis allows for the application of original text as 
written to the various situations presented by modern society, where any “evolution” 
of the text occurs only by application of that text within the confines of the grammar.  
As such, this approach also serves the essential function of binding judges to these 
rules: judges, as bound by the text, may interpret the text but may not stray from it.  
Any decision based on a provision of the Constitution must remain within the 
confines of that provision and must rest upon the precise language contained therein.  
This binding of judges further limits the capricious nature of the judiciary, 
preventing it from supplanting text with its own changing theories of modernity; 
concomitantly, it allows text to evolve while disallowing the evolution of perceived 
concepts (such as “religious liberty” embodied in the Religion Clause) that any 
particular judge or justice might “discover” in the Constitution.  This permits the 
evolution of text, as opposed to the evolution of perceived but unstated principles 
“implicit” therein, whether they be notions of “liberty” apart from its context within 
the Due Process Clause or “implied” fundamental rights.404 
This grammatical approach best preserves the original language of the First 
Amendment.  And not only does it foster the required fidelity to the text of the 
Amendment; it ensures it, because it frames the text in linguistic norms and rules that 
bound the Framers, thereby best evidencing original meaning.  If the Constitution be 
interpreted, such interpretation must occur within the confines of the document itself, 
and the explicit provisions contained therein, and those words immutably embodied 
in the document.   
When read against this backdrop, and when interpreting the entirety of the 
Religion Clause in accordance with the rules of grammar and usage, a new 
constitutional “linguistic modality” emerges.  Far from becoming dissonant 
“clauses” that set forth competing rights, or conflicting protections, the Religion 
phrases exist in an entire continuum of one independent Religion Clause that defines 
complementary rights as they both relate back to the object they modify, “law.”  This 
approach renders the Religion Clause uniform, achieves harmonization, and affirms 
the unity of the establishment and free exercise protections, in that, as stated supra, 
they both serve as restrictive modifiers of the same object, “law.”  In this respect, 
removal of the phrases leaves the simple sentence “Congress shall make no law”; the 
absence of these phrases thus renders an absurd meaning, as Congress’s very purpose 
                                                                
403 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008). 
404 Any substantive evolution of constitutional principles can only and properly occur by 
amendment, as stated supra note 7. 
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is to make law.  As such, these two phrases are harmonized by their relationship to 
the common noun they modify, “law,” because as restrictive modifiers of “law”—
necessary to identify the noun they modify, a “law respecting an establishment” and 
a “law prohibiting the free exercise” of religion—they must achieve harmony, not 
dissonance, within the parameters of the Religion Clause.    
The majority in McCreary believed it could only reconcile the entirety of the 
Religion Clause through the imposition of a neutrality standard with respect to 
establishment.  Neutrally-applied benefits or aid to religion, the refusal of which 
might lead to free exercise concerns, will accommodate free exercise but not 
constitute establishment, only so long as the provision of benefits is based on neutral 
criteria.  This is nonsense.  It is also, linguistically, impossible.  Neutrality to religion 
cannot be determinative of both phrases, as these phrases, read together as part of a 
single clause, complement and qualify each other; they do not compete, and are not 
in tension.  One provision must afford a broader protection than the other, otherwise 
the inclusion of both would have been redundant, and one mere surplusage.  Because 
a free exercise violation can exist independent of an accompanying establishment 
violation, but an establishment violation, by its very nature, cannot exist without an 
accompanying free exercise violation, the protections afforded by free exercise must 
encompass more than those of establishment.  Therefore, the threshold for a free 
exercise problem must be less than that of an establishment violation, and for this 
reason, the standard for establishment must be more restrictive, or more narrow, vis-
à-vis free exercise.  In other words, the protections afforded against establishment 
subsist with the protections afforded free exercise, such that, by necessity, a former 
violation cannot exist without a violation of the latter, but the latter can exist in the 
absence of the former. 
Within the Religion Clause, a linguistic modality emerges that clarifies the dual 
phrases contained therein, and the protections they afford.  When read in 
conjunction, the “respecting establishment” and “prohibiting free exercise” phrases 
clarify the other, as they are dual modifiers of their object, law.  As such, they cannot 
be seen as mutually exclusive or in any way competing.  In fact, this linguistic 
modality indicates that free exercise must clarify establishment, in that the existence 
of one violation presupposes the existence of the other as well, but not vice-versa.405  
                                                                
405 In linguistics, modals are expressions broadly associated with notions of possibility and 
necessity.  Modals have a wide variety of interpretations which depend not only upon the 
particular modal used, but also upon where the modal occurs in a sentence, the meaning of the 
sentence independent of the modal, the conversational context, and a variety of other factors.  
For example, the interpretation of an English sentence containing the modal “must” can be 
that of a statement of inference or knowledge (roughly, epistemic) or a statement of how 
something ought to be (roughly, deontic).  This interpretation of the Clauses conforms with a 
type of modal ontology, or a type of ontological dependence, where two or more things, 
conditions, or facts exist, one of which is a classification of the other, and may not exist 
without the other, but not vice versa.  In terms of logic, heat can exist in the absence of fire, 
but not vice versa—heat always exists in the presence of fire, but fire does not always exist in 
the presence of heat.  In constitutional terms, the specific prohibition against Establishment 
exists alongside the general protection against the prohibition of Free Exercise, where 
infringement upon Free Exercise may exist without a violation of the Establishment Clause, 
but not vice versa; i.e., a violation of the Establishment Clause cannot exist without a violation 
of the Free Exercise Clause.   
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Any other analysis renders the free exercise clause redundant.  How?  Because if the 
Founders intended establishment protections to encompass the outermost limits of 
Religion Clause protections, inclusion of free exercise would have been redundant, 
because one would necessarily encompasses the other.  By its inclusion as an 
additional, and not separate, protection (no semicolon separates establishment and 
free-exercise; the speech protections in the First Amendment, separated by a 
semicolon, are clearly separate from the religion protections) within the Religion 
Clause, free exercise must constitute a broader protection than establishment, a 
prohibition to protect against legislative acts that might limit the practice of religion 
without necessarily requiring adherence to one established orthodoxy.  Since 
establishment must prohibit free exercise, establishment occurs first within the 
Religion Clause, such that if establishment be found, the Religion Clause is violated; 
however, because free exercise encompasses a broader, more inclusive proscription, 
free exercise concerns may exist independent of establishment clause concerns, such 
that the free exercise phrase follows the establishment phrase, whereby a law not 
violating the establishment phrase may yet violate the free exercise phrase and 
thereby violate the Religion Clause. 
Now it might fairly be asked that if an establishment violation always involves a 
free exercise violation, why include a separate free exercise protection?  Or even, 
why have a separate establishment prohibition?  If the analysis begins and ends with 
a free exercise analysis, and if all violations of establishment involve prohibitions 
against free exercise, why not simply look to see if free exercise is infringed, or look 
to see if establishment is infringed, which would in turn determine a free exercise 
breach?  Impossible.  Each affords complementary but distinct protections.  To assert 
that the two phrases provide competing protections, where the tension exists in that 
the furtherance of one protection approaches the violation of the other, suggests that 
(1) the drafters somehow did not understand the English language, and (2) in some 
fashion, the Framers did not comprehend that situations could arise where Free 
Exercise would be implicated where Establishment would not.   
Because of this relationship, the government can never claim that efforts to 
accommodate a religious exercise—such as allowing for reimbursement of printing 
costs for a Christian-based newspaper, as in Rosenberger—might at some level 
threaten establishment.  Allowing for the payment of costs for printing of a Christian 
newspaper, even if not neutrally applied, in no way threatens free exercise, and in 
this sense, can never threaten establishment.  Conversely, the denial of benefits based 
on religion will always implicate free exercise, and thus have the potential, if such 
denial becomes (1) systematically oppressive, and (2) targeted at a particular religion 
or belief, to implicate establishment.  This conclusion flows from the understanding 
that two phrases provide complementary, albeit independent, protections.   
The protections afforded by establishment and free exercise thus exist within two 
distinct but interrelated “spheres” whereby the protections afforded by the 
establishment phrase exist within one sphere, that sphere subsisting within the 
broader sphere of free exercise.  In this way, then, establishment and free exercise 
cannot “compete” in any way, and an accommodation of free exercise can never 
result in a violation of establishment, because free exercise concerns always 
accompany establishment concerns.  Moreover, because establishment concerns 
never exist once a free exercise violation is found lacking, and because establishment 
protections are more restrictive than those afforded free exercise, neutrality and 
accommodation analyses become irrelevant to any establishment examination.   
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An illustrative Venn diagram406 of this subsistence would appear as: 
 
In terms of the relationship of the two protections—outer sphere (free exercise) 
and inner sphere (establishment)—one exists as a subsistent protection within the 
other, or in other words, as an absolute prohibition, or more deeply imbedded right 
within a more expansive right.  Therefore, if establishment be threatened, free 
exercise has already been violated.  For example, the government might pass a law 
patently discriminatory to one particular religion, or a law hostile towards outward 
displays of that religion—say, a law banning the use of bumper stickers with 
Christian messages, under the guise of the state’s regulatory authority over the 
licensure and operation of motor vehicles.  Leaving aside any equal protection 
arguments, such a law, while demonstrating clear hostility to religious messages, or 
particular strands thereof, establishes nothing, and does not respect the establishment 
of anything other than hostility.  Such law does however, display (1) a lack of 
neutrality, (2) a purpose directly related to religion, (3) the effect of inhibiting a 
religious exercise, and (4) the coercive prohibition under penalty of law—thus 
bearing all the hallmarks of the Court’s different establishment models.  Yet, while 
the law does not implicate establishment, it clearly implicates free exercise.    
                                                                
406 Venn diagrams depict through the use of concentric and intersecting circles, all logical 
relations hypothetically possible between some finite collection of sets and the terms of 
propositions by the inclusion, exclusion, or intersection of the circles; in the case of the 
possible propositions included with establishment and within free exercise problems, the 
circles representative of each set would have some logical relation to the other, as depicted by 
the intersection of such circles.  See http://mathworld.wolfram.com/VennDiagram.html.    
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If such be the case, then in no way can any establishment analysis “eviscerate” 
the protections afforded free exercise—be it by requiring neutrality, coercion, or 
endorsement.  Since establishment necessarily involves official sanction, then such 
sanction must occur at the expense or to the detriment of what is not sanctioned, or 
what falls outside the establishment.  Conversely, if no threat exists to free exercise, 
then no threat can possibly exist as to establishment.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Proper constitutional interpretation must involve sound methodology with a fixed 
point of reference.  This methodology must begin and end with the textual language 
so construed, with analysis guided by the rules of grammar and usage inherent within 
the document.   Foremost, this creates and sustains a constitutional jurisprudence 
founded upon clear, unwavering, and workable standards, by which courts may 
decide Establishment issues, and safeguards the primacy of the Constitution and the 
judicial adherence thereto.  The development of a standard that operates within the 
confines of the rules of grammar and usage does not preclude a fact-intensive 
analysis that may be required in any given case.  While facts always vary, the 
standard must not.  Textual standards allow for unwavering decisional guidance 
within which the facts operate, maintain uniformity and consistency of application, 
and provide solid guidance to lower courts, legislators, and attorneys alike.   
Because the tripart approach in Lemon, as well as the concepts of endorsement, 
coercion, and to a certain extent, neutrality, have all employed super-constitutional 
principles and surrogate concepts, they fail as constitutional standards.  More 
importantly, they involve concepts that implicate free exercise analysis as well.  
Using a linguistic modality approach, as governed by the rules of grammar and 
usage, the test for establishment cannot be intermingled with free exercise analysis, 
because a free exercise violation can exist notwithstanding the absence of an 
establishment concern.  Therefore, any discussion of establishment must involve a 
more extreme analysis as appropriate to its subject, that being, the punishment of 
dissent.  In other words, the modality of the two clauses would presuppose a free 
exercise violation where an establishment violation exists.  If a passive Christmas 
display depicting the manger scene to the exclusion of secular material would not 
implicate free exercise, it could never constitute an establishment, or a law 
respecting one.  Far from becoming an establishment problem, the manger scene, 
even if “endorsing” the Christian aspects of the holiday, would remain 
constitutionally harmless.  
Likewise, a “history-and-traditions” approach is equally unworkable.  History 
and tradition, while certainly illustrative, cannot provide a clear standard, because 
this history and these traditions only acquire relevance and meaning as seen through 
the eyes of the present, and any such perception must always be subject to the 
particularities of the lens through which they are viewed.  As such, history-and-
traditions become, from a constitutional standpoint, “[A] poor player / That struts 
and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no more; it is a tale / Told by an 
idiot, full of sound and fury / Signifying nothing.”407  The primary weakness with the 
                                                                
407
 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5; see also Psalms 90:9 (King James) 
(“For all our days are passed away in thy wrath: we spend our years as a tale that is told.”). 
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history/traditions approach becomes its own brittleness, its own subjective character, 
and the capricious and contradictory interpretations of its audience, where selective 
borrowing from historical documents or traditions leads to hopelessly inconclusive 
or even contrary results.  Neutrality analysis fails because, given the modality of the 
Religion Clause itself, such an approach creates inconsistency between the 
Establishment and Free Exercise phrases of the Religion Clause.   
The rules of grammar and usage—modern linguistics—bear no such frailty, and 
must serve as the constitutional benchmark out of which emerges constitutional 
interpretation.  Laws respecting establishment of religion remain that which are 
prohibited, and would require (1) law, and if there be a law, then the law (2) 
respecting establishment, and if it be a law respecting establishment, then (3) a 
determination of what is established.  Therefore, endorsement, effect, or coercion, 
psychological or otherwise, become irrelevant as constitutional guides.  If the display 
of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse, even if by law, does not respect 
an establishment of Judaism, by requiring adherence to the tenets of that faith, the 
display does not implicate the Establishment Clause, even if such a display might be 
a patent governmental preference for a depiction of Mosaic law over that of Solon.  
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